Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age by Martin, Peter W.
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
2008
Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of
Precedent for a Digital Age
Peter W. Martin
Cornell Law School, peter.martin@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers
Part of the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martin, Peter W., "Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age" (2008). Cornell Law Faculty
Publications. Paper 89.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/89
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 53 2008 NUMBER 1
Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture
RECONFIGURING LAW REPORTS AND THE CONCEPT OF
PRECEDENT FOR A DIGITAL AGE*
PETER W. MARTIN**
I. INTRODUCTION
N DHERENCE to the "rule of law" entails a strong commitment to con-
istency-a belief that throughout a jurisdiction and across time
judges and other public officials should treat like cases alike.' Within
American jurisprudence, explicit doctrines of precedent serve as impor-
tant means to that end.2 As expressed in standard formulations of the
need to follow precedent or adhere to the rule of "stare decisis"3 this is not
so much a consequence of resistance to legal change, but of a set of views
* © Peter W. Martin, 2007. This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-ShareAike 3.0 License. To view a copy of
this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ or send a
letter to Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco,
California 94105, USA. The article is based on the Reuschlein Lecture delivered at
Villanova University School of Law in April 2007.
** Jane M.G. Foster Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, New York,
and cofounder, Legal Information Institute.
1. The phrase "rule of law" has been used and abused to the point where it
may carry little content. See David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK
L. REv. 307, 308 (2003). Careful attempts to disaggregate the concept stress the
importance of consistency, stability and knowability. See Joseph Raz, The Rule of
Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAw: ESSAYs ON LAW AND MORALITY 221
(Oxford Univ. Press 1979, 2002).
2. The U.S. is not unique in making this linkage. See generally INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers
eds., 1997).
3. The phrase "stare decisis" is often used interchangeably with notions of
precedent. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent,
50 DUKE LJ. 503, 513 n.25 (2000) [hereinafter Power of Congress]. Some scholars,
however, distinguish between the two concepts. See, e.g., PollyJ. Price, Precedent and
Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REv. 81, 84 n.10 (2000); Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 576 n.ll (1987). Because "precedent" has
broader connotations than "stare decisis," precedent will be the term used
throughout this article.
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about the judicial role. 4 Patently, new legislation, administrative regula-
tions and court rules produce legal change to which judges must attend.
Moreover, in America's layered legal system, determinations by federal
courts on matters of national law can compel a shift in how state judges
decide entire categories of cases. Judges of a jurisdiction's court of last
resort will, on occasion, overrule past precedent. Barring such circum-
stances, however, judges are expected-indeed within limits they are obli-
gated-to adhere to precedent.
Given the spectacular variety produced by U.S. federalism, attempts
to describe or analyze the operation of precedent or any other aspect of
judicial function face a daunting challenge. The difficulty is compounded
during periods of rapid change. Forming a composite of all fifty states is
not especially useful. History, size and countless other variables invite but
also vex attempts to organize states into categories. In all likelihood, these
complexities are one of the reasons legal scholars focus so disproportion-
ately on federal law and the federal courts. But on this topic in particular,
that is not an appropriate strategy.
5
4. It has even been argued that the constraint of precedent on judicial deci-
sion-making is implicit in the judicial function allocated to courts under Article III
of the U.S. Constitution. In a decision by the late Judge Richard Arnold, subse-
quently vacated on grounds of mootness, the Eighth Circuit held unconstitutional
its own rule denying "unpublished" decisions the effect of precedent. See Anas-
tasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated en banc as moot,
235 F.3d 1054, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 2000). The rule, the decision said, purported "to
confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the 'judicial."' Id. Judge
Arnold's position has not found support in the judiciary. See Hart v. Massanari,
266 F.3d 1155, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, its historic basis has been
criticized by scholars. See, e.g., R. Ben Brown, Judging in the Days of the Early Republic:
A Critique of Judge Richard Arnold's Use of History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3J.
App. PRAC. & PROCEss 355, 383 (2001) ("These examples from the history ofjudg-
ing during the years of the early Republic show that not only the relative roles of
judges and the legislature, but also the sources of law, and even the meaning of
allowing judges the power to 'find' law, were all contested issues."); Thomas Healy,
Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 43, 120 (2001) ("But
although Judge Arnold's analysis points out a valuable new area of research, his
conclusions about the history of stare decisis are contestable."); Peter M. Tiersma,
The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1187, 1266-71 (2007) ("It is
simply not correct that in the late-eighteenth century, any previous case was bind-
ing authority in the way it is today."). But see Price, supra note 3, at 81 (explaining
"consistent 'core idea' of precedent ... even where there are varying ideas about
the binding nature of that precedent").
5. While not ignoring the federal courts, this article focuses primarily on the
states. It does so for several reasons. First, state and federal court systems have
quite different histories and face quite different challenges in the dissemination of
precedent. Second, while the volume of adjudication guided by precedent in state
courts vastly exceeds that in the federal courts, the bulk of the scholarly writing
about precedent, citation reform, treatment of unpublished decisions and other
topics covered in this article has concentrated on the federal courts. That imbal-
ance calls for correction. Third, within the variety of the fifty states, there are
many more useful illustrations of how digital technology may effect the operation
of precedent than have yet emerged in the single judicial system made up of the
federal courts. For purposes of this study, the federal courts are treated simply as
HeinOnline -- 53 Vill. L. Rev. 2 2008
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This exploration of precedent, law reports and digital technology ap-
proaches the multiple-jurisdiction problem through the use of a single il-
lustrative state: Kansas. This strategy has the advantage of anchoring the
analysis, while allowing comparative references to other jurisdictions. 6
Why Kansas? Initially, the selection was suggested by geography; Kansas is
located at the geographic center of the forty-eight contiguous states.
Other factors support this choice. In numerous, arguably more important
dimensions, Kansas also lies toward the middle of the full fifty-state spec-
trum. Its population and number of practicing lawyers are neither unusu-
ally large nor unusually small.7 While the Kansas judicial structure has no
idiosyncratic features, 8 its appellate decisions command significant recog-
nition and respect beyond the state's borders.9 Like many states, Kansas
has taken steps to unify the administration and funding of courts through-
out its jurisdiction, but like most, it has not completed the task. And criti-
cally, Kansas has not, to date, made significant adjustments in the
dissemination or treatment of precedent in response to digital technol-
ogy-also the case with most U.S. jurisdictions.
The Kansas judicial system rests on a layer of district courts-trial
courts with general jurisdiction spread across the state. These are aug-
mented by a set of municipal courts that are funded by and generate reve-
nue for local units of government. 10 Their jurisdiction is limited to traffic
infractions and other ordinance violations occurring within the bounda-
one more U.S. judicial structure, albeit one to which all other courts must, on
occasion, pay heed.
6. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Precedent in the United States (New York State), in
INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 2, at 355404. This
classic comparative study of precedent adopts a similar approach, using New York
as the representative U.S. jurisdiction.
7. See U.S. Census Bureau, States Ranked by Population: 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2OOO/phc-t2/tabOl.pdf. In 2000, Kansas
ranked 32nd among the states in population. Id. Kansas is ranked 29th in the
number of practicing lawyers. See American Bar Association, National Lawyer Pop-
ulation by State (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2006-
national%20_lawyer-population survey.pdf.
8. See Kansas Judicial Branch, http://www.kscourts.org (last visited Dec. 7,
2007); David B. Rottman and Shauna M. Strickland, State Court Organization,
2004, U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Washington, D.C. USGPO,
2006, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ptib/pdf/scoO4.pdf [hereinafter
State Court Organization]. See generally DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2006).
9. SeeJake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, "Followed Rates" and Leading State Cases,
1940-2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 695 n.23 (2007).
10. Fines and costs imposed by Topeka's municipal court generate well over
$3 million a year for the city; the court costs total approximately $1.7 million. See
Topeka, Kansas, 2007 City Budget, available at http://www.topeka.org/
2007_- budgetadopted.shtml (follow Revenue Estimation and Department Budget
Information, Municipal Court hyperlinks).
2008]
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ries of 393 Kansas cities."' While the district courts operate within thirty-
one judicial districts, each of the state's 105 counties is served by at least
one district judge.12 These counties range in population from Greeley
County with approximately 1,500 residents to Sedgwick County with a pop-
ulation of nearly half a million. 13 In addition to their trial jurisdiction,
Kansas district courts also hear appeals from municipal court convictions 14
and diverse administrative determinations.' 5
During fiscal year 2005, Kansas district courts disposed of approxi-
mately half a million cases. Slightly more than 40% involved traffic infrac-
tions.16 The balance included approximately 36,000 criminal cases (more
than half of them felonies), a comparable number of domestic relations
matters, and over 165,000 civil cases of other types; the majority of these
other cases involved claims of $25,000 or less and 10,000 fell within the
"small claims" category, meaning they involved stakes of $4,000 or less. 17
Add the misdemeanor, traffic, building code, noise and other ordinance-
based cases heard by Kansas municipal judges in a year, plus the worker's
compensation, tax and other agency adjudications ultimately appealable
to Kansas courts, and it should become clear that achieving consistent and
accurate application of the law throughout this dispersed judicial system-
the ultimate aim of precedent-is an enormous challenge.
While the numerous adjudications of the Kansas district courts are
the ultimate target of precedent, this foundational layer of the Kansas judi-
ciary, like trial courts in most other states, produces none.' 8 As doctrines
11. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 124104 (2006), amended by 2007 Kan. Sess. Laws 168.
See Kansas Judicial Branch, Municipal Courts, http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-
courts/municipal-courts/default.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
12. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-301, 20-301b (2007).
13. Kansas Counties, http://skyways.lib.ks.us/counties/ (last visited Dec. 7,
2007).
14. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3609 (2007) (granting "the right to appeal to the
district court of the county from any judgment of a municipal court which ad-
judges the defendant guilty of a violation of the ordinances of any municipality of
Kansas or any findings of contempt").
15. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-609 (2007) (granting general judicial review with
few exceptions).
16. See Annual Report of the Courts of Kansas, Fiscal Year 2005, Summary of
District Court Caseload for the State, available at http://intra.kscourts.org:7780/
stats/05/CaseloadfortheStateO5.pdf.
17. See id.
18. To begin, there is no constitutional principle or general requirement in
Kansas law that trial judges write out their reasons for specific legal rulings. See
Chad M. Oldfather, Writing Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEo.
L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 6, on file with author). The Kansas Su-
preme Court has indicated that when a trial judge decides on a sentence above the
statutory minimum "it is the better practice for the sentencing court to place on
the record a detailed statement of the facts and factors it considered." State v.
Bennett, 731 P.2d 284, 286 (Kan. 1987). But that statement can be rendered
orally, and a failure to state reasons does not by itself establish an abuse of discre-
tion. See id. Judges deviating from the Kansas Child Support Guidelines must ei-
ther support their decisions with written findings or make "specific findings on the
HeinOnline -- 53 Vill. L. Rev. 4 2008
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of precedent currently operate in Kansas, precedent can arise only when
and if a trial court decision on some point or application of law is ap-
pealed, and then only under very limited conditions. To hear appeals
from district court proceedings, Kansas has a two-tiered appellate struc-
ture, consisting of an intermediate court of appeals established in 1977
and a supreme court which can trace its origins back to a date prior to
statehood. 9
The primary responsibility of the Kansas Court of Appeals-a court
comprised of thirteen2t 1 judges who normally hear and dispose of appeals
in panels of three (with rotating membership) 2 1 -is to correct trial court
errors, including but not limited to failures to adhere to precedent. Un-
like the decisions it reviews, some, although far from all, of the decisions
rendered by this front-line appellate court do operate as precedent.
Under current Kansas law and court practice, roughly 12% of the cases
decided by the Kansas Court of Appeals (143 out of 1156 during the 2005
fiscal year) have precedential weight or effect.22 With few exceptions,
most decisions of the Court of Appeals, both those that count as precedent
and those that do not, can be appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court.
2 3
The Kansas Supreme Court, the state's highest appellate court, can dis-
record." In re Marriage of Schletzbaum, 809 P,2d 1251, 1254 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
In these and other situations Kansas trial judges do, as they deem appropriate,
issue written opinions. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 30 P.3d 1001, 1005 (Kan. 2001);
State v. Wonders, 952 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Kan. 1998). But when they do there is no
public mechanism for bringing those opinions to the attention of others than
those directly involved in the litigation, nor are judges or other public officials
under any obligation to treat those opinions as precedent.
19. See Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law: A
Proposal for the Elimination of the Rules Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished Decisions
in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 155, 160-61 (1992). There was an
earlier Kansas Court of Appeals, established in 1895. Its legislative charter expired
at the beginning of 1901. See id. at 160 n.31. The precursor to the Kansas Su-
preme Court was the Territorial Supreme Court, which held its first session on July
30, 1855. See Kansas Judicial Branch, History of the Kansas Appellate Courts, avail-
able at http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-courts/general-information/history.asp.
20. Prior to January 2008 there were twelve judges. See Kay McFarland, Chief
Justice, Kansas Supreme Court, State of the Judiciary 3-4 (2007), available at http:/
/www.kscourts.org/pdf/Judiciary-Message/SOJ041007.pdf.
21. See KAN. SuP. CT. R. 7.02 (explaining that hearings before Court of Ap-
peals occur "before the judges of the court, sitting en banc, or in hearing panels
designated by the Chief Judge of the court"); State Court Organization, supra note 8,
Table 23 (listing typical panel as consisting of threejudges). For a rare example of
an en banc decision of the Kansas Court of Appeals (its most recent), see Kansas
Assoc. of Pub. Employees v. Pub. Employee Relations Bd., 778 P.2d 377, 378-80 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1989).
22. Out of the 1,156 opinions handed down by the Kansas Court of Appeals
during the 2005 fiscal year, only 143 (12.4%) were "published" and therefore pre-
cedent under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2106 (2007) and KAN. SuP. CT. R. 7.04(f)(2).
These figures are derived from the decision lists at http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-
and-Opinions/Date-of-Release-List/#ctapp.
23. KAN. SuP. CT. R. 8.03(a) ("Any party aggrieved by a decision of the Court
of Appeals may petition the Supreme Court for discretionary review.").
2008]
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pose of appeals in several ways. With appeals as to which its review is dis-
cretionary (the case with most appeals), the Kansas Supreme Court can
simply allow the decision of the Court of Appeals to stand.24 Like the
Court of Appeals, it can also dispose of cases it chooses to review, as well as
those it must take, with decisions that are not precedential. 25 While 880
appeals were filed with the Kansas Supreme Court in the 2005 fiscal year,26
it issued only 117 decisions that counted as precedent.27
In sum, the right of appeal, first to the Kansas Court of Appeals, and
subsequently to the Kansas Supreme Court, operates primarily as a direct
means of correcting trial court errors. Standing alone, however, unas-
sisted by doctrines of precedent, appeals would have to be far more nu-
merous than they are to have much effect on district court operations.
Doctrines of precedent extend the reach of a small subset of the decisions
rendered by Kansas appellate courts each year to all future cases coming
before Kansas courts (both trial and appellate) that raise issues on which
precedent exists.
While the terminology used to draw the distinction varies, scholars
regularly separate the operation of precedent into two categories likely to
be useful here: horizontal and vertical.2s "Horizontal" adherence to pre-
cedent occurs when a court follows its own earlier holdings in resolving the
same issue in a current case. 29 An example of precedent applying in this
24. During the 2005 fiscal year, the Kansas Supreme Court received 880 fil-
ings of which 619 (70.3%) were "petitions for review." Over the same period it
denied review in 505 such cases and disposed of another 59 cases without opinion.
See Annual Report of the Courts of Kansas, Fiscal Year 2005, Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals Caseload Activity, available at http://intra.kscourts.org:7780/
stats/05/2005 Appellate Court.pdf. The Court's review of Court of Appeals deci-
sions is, in general, discretionary. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3018(b) (2007) (stating
that "the review of any [appeal] shall be at the discretion of the supreme court").
This is one of the many respects in which the Kansas judicial structure is typical.
See MEADOR, supra note 8, at 17 ("[I]n three-tiered judicial systems it is generally
provided that appeal may be taken as a matter of right to the intermediate court
but that any further review in the supreme court is at the discretion of that
court.").
25. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2106(a) ("A memorandum opinion may be pre-
pared in any case where no new question of law is decided or which is otherwise
considered as having no value as a precedent."); KAN. SuP. CT. R. 7.04(f)(2) (ex-
plaining that unpublished memorandum opinions are not binding precedents and
are not favored for citation).
26. See supra note 24.
27. This count is derived from the decision lists at http://www.kscourts.org/
Cases-and-Opinions/Date-of-Release-List/. The same lists show another ninety-
nine "unpublished decisions" of the court. The court's statistical reports show a
slightly larger number of decisions "with opinions" than the sum of these two
figures.
28. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 3, at 513 n.25 ("Vertical stare decisis refers to
the rule that courts must follow the precedents of courts above them in the appel-
late hierarchy .... Horizontal stare decisis refers to the rule that a court must
follow its own precedents.").
29. See generally Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force
of Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1075 (2003).
[Vol. 53: p. I
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fashion appears in Kahm v. Arkansas River Gas Co.3" In Kahm, the Kansas
Supreme Court wrote: "We have not failed to note the more or less analo-
gous cases from other jurisdictions which the diligence of counsel has
brought together for our perusal; but with due respect thereto we are
bound to follow our own precedents .... -31 Operating horizontally, pre-
cedent works to achieve consistency across time, through changes in judi-
cial personnel, and, with courts divided into panels or circuits, from one
panel or circuit to another.3 2
"Vertical" applications of precedent reflect and express the hierarchy
in court structures.33 When a lower court in Kansas adheres to prior hold-
ings of a superior court (the Kansas Court of Appeals follows a decision of
the Kansas Supreme Court or a Kansas district court follows an opinion of
either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court), precedent is operat-
ing vertically. As explained by the Kansas Court of Appeals in Noone v.
Chalet of Wichita:34 "We are duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court
precedent unless there is some indication that the court is departing from
its previous position .... ,,35
Judges, and occasionally scholars, use the term "precedent" in a third
way. When a legal question arises and there is neither vertical nor hori-
zontal precedent, a court may nonetheless speak of an opinion by another
court-one that it has no obligation to follow-as "precedent." When a
court uses the word in this way, it means simply that the issue is not "un-
precedented" and that a prior court ruling may offer a useful template for
its consideration, possible adaptation and use. In State v. Wyman,3 6 for
example, the Kansas Supreme Court referred to decisions from two other
states as potential "precedents" in this looser sense. 37 More often, under
these circumstances, the Kansas Supreme Court and other courts will refer
30. 253 P. 563 (Kan. 1927).
31. Id. at 566.
32. The application of "horizontal precedent" within courts divided into
panels, circuits or districts can and does take many shapes. It may well have
changed over time with the federal circuit courts. See Harrison, supra note 3, at
516 (citing Shreve v. Cheesman, 69 F. 785 (8th Cir. 1895)) (explaining that while
federal appellate courts are not currently bound by the decisions of other circuits,
"the rule may have been the opposite a hundred years ago"). In Kansas, published
decisions of one panel of the Court of Appeals are said to be binding on another
panel, but not on the full court sitting en banc. See In re L.D.B., 924 P.2d 642, 645
(Kan. Ct. App. 1996); In re Cray, 867 P.2d 291, 297 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). That
does not seem to prevent panels from disagreeing. See, e.g., State v. Moody, 144
P.3d 612 (Kan. 2006).
33. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994) (exploring concept of vertical precedent
and justifications of doctrine).
34. 96 P.3d 674 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
35. Id. at 675.
36. 426 P.2d 26 (Kan. 1967).
37. Id. at 29.
2008]
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to decisions from other jurisdictions as potentially "persuasive
authority."3
8
Operating in these several ways, precedent, often referred to collec-
tively as "case law," not only induces consistency in adjudication, but also
casts a long shadow beyond. Precedent informs private decisions about
whether to litigate, how to structure negotiated settlements or business
transactions, and whether and, if so, how to proceed with other activities
posing potential legal consequences or risks.
In cases of prior litigation involving the same parties, several far nar-
rower consistency doctrines operate. They bear such names as res judi-
cata, collateral estoppel3 9 and law of the case. 40 What is distinctive about
notions of precedent is that they operate when the parties in the second
case have no connection whatsoever with the parties in the earlier case
and thus have no direct personal knowledge of the decision in it. The
time separating these cases can be days or decades, yet for precedent to
function, knowledge is essential. Ajudge cannot consider and apply prior
opinions as precedent unless the judge and the lawyers arguing the case
before the judge have some effective way to know of them. The same
holds for those who would consider case law in shaping transactions or
planning some other course of action. For this reason, the operation of
precedent is dependent upon and therefore inescapably affected by the
information dissemination, storage and retrieval systems available to
38. The persuasive force of such non-binding precedent can be very strong.
Since the Kansas Corporation Code is based on the Delaware code, Delaware deci-
sions interpreting its provisions carry significant weight in Kansas. See, e.g., Vogel v.
Mo. Valley Steel, Inc., 625 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Kan. 1981) (explaining that "Kansas
Corporation Code was patterned after the Delaware Corporation Code and there-
fore, Delaware decisions interpreting its code are considered persuasive in [the]
interpretation of the Kansas code") (internal citation omitted). Similarly, federal
court decisions applying the federal rules of civil procedure are "highly persuasive"
on issues arising under the comparable Kansas rules. See, e.g., Wood v. Groh, 7
P.3d 1163, 1171 (Kan. 2000) ("Kansas courts often look to the case law on the
federal rules as guidance for interpretation of our own rules, as the Kansas rules of
civil procedure were patterned after the federal rules.").
39. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The Supreme Court
has explained that
Under resjudicata, a finaljudgment on the merits of an action precludes
the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have
been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, once a court has
decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision
may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of
action involving a party to the first case.
Id. (internal citation omitted). For the use of a prior decision as the basis for
collateral estoppel when court rules forbade its use as precedent, see Edwards v.
State, 862 N.E.2d 1254, 1259-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
40. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) ("Unlike the more pre-
cise requirements of res judicata, law of the case is an amorphous concept. As
most commonly defined, the doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule
of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent
stages in the same case.").
[Vol. 53: p. I
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judges, lawyers and others who would seek to gather case law bearing on a
particular issue.4 This article examines that connection.
In critical ways, current American ideas about precedent are the prod-
uct of print law reports. The systematic publication of written decisions of
America's appellate courts, which arose in the nineteenth century and
flourished during the twentieth, was at least as much a source of this coun-
try's distinctive views of precedent as a consequence of them.42 Inherent
limits of that mode of dissemination have influenced what counts as prece-
dent and what does not in ways that have only become evident during the
recent shift to electronic distribution. With unsettling rapidity, digital
technology has dislodged print law reports, in practical fact, if not yet in
the way lawyers and judges talk and think about case law. Even as courts
continue to distinguish between published and unpublished decisions and
cite precedent using volume and page numbers, federal courts at all levels
operate under a statute calling upon them to place "the substance of all
[their] written opinions" on the Internet.43 State courts have begun do-
ing the same without legislative mandate. Vast numbers of "unpublished"
decisions of state and federal courts, decisions that have no volume and
page numbers, are now collected and organized, linked and annotated in
virtual law libraries. For judges, judicial clerks, lawyers and others search-
ing for precedent, these online databases have supplanted library shelves
filled with law report volumes in less than a decade.
Taking consistency and predictability of judicial decision-making as
the ends toward which doctrines of precedent are simply a means, the
ultimate question this article aims to explore is how ideas of precedent
might be reshaped in consequence of this radically altered reality. En
route to that zone of speculation, the article will, of necessity, pass by and
41. Michele Taruffo, Institutional Factors Influencing Precedents, in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 2, at 451-54 (explaining influence
of reporting on precedent). Taruffo states:
A judgment may actually become a precedent only when it is known not
only by the parties to the single case but also to other courts, to lawyers
and virtually to the general public. Therefore the devices aimed at pub-
lishing judgments in order to make them known are essential to any sys-
tem of precedent. If only a published judgment may be a precedent, the
ways in whichjudgments are reported substantially determines the nature
and use of precedents.
Id. at 451. Grant Gilmore's survey of American law passes over the colonial period
because of the absence of reports. Gilmore explains: "[T]here can hardly be a
legal system until the decisions of the courts are regularly published and available
to the bench and bar." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERI cAN LAw 9 (1977).
42. See generally Frederick G. Kempin,Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical
Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 Am. J. LEG. HIST. 28, 31-35 (1959) (exploring history and
importance of reporting in England and United States).
43. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a) (5), 116 Stat.
2899, 2913 (2002) (requiring that chief justices of different courts establish and
maintain website containing information including "[a]ccess to the substance of
all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to
be published in the official court reporter, in a text searchable format").
2008]
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observe how current concepts of precedent and limits inherent in print
law reports are linked and identify problems that arise from the continued
use of print-based ideas and practices now that case law flows along elec-
tronic channels.
II. PRECEDENT DISSEMINATION IN THE PRE-DIGITAL ERA
A. Public Law Reports
In judicial systems that function like those of Kansas and other U.S.
jurisdictions, for past judicial opinions to guide future cases, it is essential
that those opinions be readily accessible to both presiding judges and the
lawyers presenting them with opposing legal arguments. In addition, un-
less all the participants are quite literally reading from the same page,
there must be a system of citation enabling precise reference to those past
opinions and the specific passages within them pertinent to the present
controversy. 4 4 For over a century, the mode of information dissemination
fulfilling these requirements and thereby providing infrastructure for the
operation of precedent consisted of judge-written opinions, distributed in
publicly ,sponsored print law reports.
Law reports produced in this fashion developed during the nine-
teenth century and set U.S. judicial practice apart from its historic ante-
cedents. 4 5  Congress authorized appointment of the first "official
reporter" of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 1817.46 An order issued
by the Court in 1834 marked the end of the practice of rendering oral
opinions and regularized the flow of written decisions to the reporter.47
Having official law reports was an established part of the statehood pack-
age for states admitted to the union after the Civil War.4 8 By the end of
44. During the earlier years in Kansas when law books were still scarce, that
was not unknown. See Robert A. Mead & Michael H. Hoeflich, Lawyers and Law
Books in Nineteenth-Century Kansas, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1051, 1072 (2002).
45. See generally Denis P. Duffey, Jr., Genre and Authority: The Rise of Case Report-
ing in the Early United States, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 263 (1998).
46. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 63
(1990) ("In 1817, the Supreme Court was authorized to appoint a reporter at an
annual salary of $1,000, with the requirement that he deliver to the Secretary of
State fifty copies of his volumes.").
47. See id. at 64 (detailing end of Supreme Court oral opinions).
48. See generally id. at 28-33 (discussing progress made in legal publishing after
Civil War). Between 1863 and 1900, West Virginia, Nevada, Nebraska, Colorado,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming and Utah
were granted statehood. In all cases, the jurisdiction's law reports date from the
first year of statehood or before. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION
tbl.T.1, at 202, 207, 217, 218, 226, 232, 236, 237, 238, 239 (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005) [hereinafter BLUEBOOK]. For an account of the
origins of law reporting in one of those states, see Tim Fuller, "The Most Accurate
and Useful Law Books Possible," Wash. Terr., Wash., Wn.2d, and Wn. App.: Milestones of
Official Case Reporting in Washington, WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, Nov. 2005, at 22, available
at http://www.wsba.org/media/publications/barnews/fuller-novO5.htm. The
troubled early history of Kansas delayed the appearance of its first law reports. See
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the century, nearly all states in the U.S. had established publicly sponsored
law reports that disseminated opinions of at least their highest court.49
These opinions were written by the judges themselves, rather than a re-
porter's reconstructions of remarks delivered ex tempore from the bench. 50
Key elements of the public law report system can still be seen etched
in the statutes of a number of states where it continues to operate. 5 1 In-
cluded in this group is the state of Kansas, which still produces the Kansas
Reports and the Kansas Court of Appeals Reports.52 The first step is timely
delivery of written appellate opinions to a public official, the reporter of
decisions. 53 In many states, including Kansas, the statutory framework rec-
ognizes that not all decisions made by an appellate court warrant full opin-
ions articulating reasons 54 and that not even all written opinions warrant
publication. 55 The reporter's job is to organize all publishable opinions
Mead & Hoeflich, supra note 44, at 1063 (explaining effect of Quantrill's Raid on
first volume of Kansas reporter).
49. See Edward W. Jessen, Official Law Reporting in the United States, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON OFFICIAL LAW REPORTING, at 28,
31 (2004). Jessen explains that "by the end of the 19th century all reporters were
on salary, and all reports were printed at the expense of the states." Id. at 31.
50. See id. at 32 (explaining trend in late eighteenth century "requiring that
judges write their opinions rather than merely state them orally, and leave it to
reporters to transcribe and enhance the oral opinions"). The insistence that
judges-or at least appellate judges-write out their decisions was also a mid- to
late nineteenth century reform, often combined with the establishment of the of-
fice of law reporter. An 1841 Georgia statute mandated written opinions. See id.;
SURRENCY, supra note 46, at 41-42 (describing Georgia statute requiring "trial
judges to write out their decisions 'in a fair and legible hand' and place them in
the minutes of the court"). A Pennsylvania statute did the same in 1845 as it au-
thorized the appointment of an official court reporter. SeeJoel Fishman, The Re-
ports of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 87 LAw LiBR. J. 643, 644-45 (1995).
51. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 68900-05 (2007); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/1-
7 (2007); OH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2503.19 to 2503.25 (2007).
52. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-201 to 20-208 (2007).
53. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/7 (2007) (requiring clerks of supreme
and appellate courts to furnish state reporter with decision of those courts within
ten days of decisions becoming final); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-202 (2007) (requiring
justices of Kansas Supreme Court to prepare and deliver to state reporter full notes
related to all publishable decisions within sixty days after close of term in which
decisions were rendered). In a number of states, including Kansas, the office of
reporter is established by the constitution. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 4.
54. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws 221, § 64 (2007) (describing role of state re-
porter in choosing cases for publication "according to their relative importance").
The Kansas Supreme Court's decisions not to consider cases, like decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court denying certiorari, are made without any statement of rea-
sons. See KAN. STAT. ANN. 20-112 (2007) (requiring court to reduce to writing only
those cases in which it renders opinion). Some appellate courts also deal with
appeals judged to be totally without merit by summarily affirming the decision
below. In many states, not even all written appellate decisions are published. It is
not surprising then that only a handful of states have ever made provision for pub-
lication of trial court decisions. See infra note 87.
55. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 154-3 (2007) (describing power of justices or
judges to direct reporter to omit full publication of cases that may be understood
by synopsis). The Kansas code calls for publication only of those supreme court
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into volumes, adding such editorial elements as syllabi and the names of
attorneys, along with tables of contents and topical indices.
56
The reporter or a comparable public official is also responsible for
overseeing law report production and distribution. 57 Typically, this occurs
in two waves: softcover advance sheets, followed months later by
hardbound volumes. 58 Both are distributed at public expense to the juris-
diction's judges at all levels and sold, often at a controlled price, to lawyers
and libraries. 59 The typical statute also contemplates an exchange of re-
ports with other states, a form of barter aimed at securing resources for
the state law library.
60
Details vary from state to state. Kansas is, today, unusual in having its
reports printed and distributed by units of state government, rather than
under contract by a commercial publisher.6 1 It is also one of a small num-
ber of states in which summaries of the key points of law in an opinion
(the syllabus or set of headnotes) are prepared by the court itself, rather
than added by the reporter or a private contractor. 6 2 The fundamental
opinions "which the court deem of sufficient importance to be published" and
those opinions of the court of appeals "which are to be published pursuant to rule
of the supreme court." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-205 (2007).
56. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-204 (2007) (describing required contents of
published opinion). In some states, the statute specifically contemplates the out-
sourcing of some of these editorial functions. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/3
(2007) (requiring reporter of decisions to supervise publication and distribution
of text of decisions under contracts approved by Supreme Court).
57. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/2, 65/6 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-
205, 2-208 (2007) (requiring reporter to coordinate production of law reports and
their distribution to public officials and others).
58. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/2 (describing process for publication of re-
ports of supreme and appellate court decisions).
59. See, e.g., id. at 65/6 (2007) (mandating distribution of published reports
to various state and federal officials); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-208(a) (6) (2007) (man-
dating distribution of published reports to each district court judge). A similar
distribution list for the Georgia Reports and Georgia Appeals Reports is set forth at GA.
CODE ANN. § 50-18-31 (2006).
60. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-208 (2007) (providing for distribution of pub-
lished reports for exchange purposes); see also GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-11-6, 50-18-31
(2006). The Kansas Supreme Court Law Library once participated in fifty-eight
exchanges of the state's law reports for reports of other states and law reviews.
Today, the number is nineteen. E-mail from Claire King, Assistant Director, Kan-
sas Supreme Court Law Library, to author (Feb. 26, 2007) (on file with author)
(adding that over years exchanges have dwindled to nineteen at present due to
states ceasing publication of official state reporters or states no longer desiring to
collect reports of other states).
61. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-205, 20-208 (2007) (describing role of reporter
in supervising printing and distribution of published decisions).
62. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-203 (2007) (requiring judge writing opinion to
also write syllabus that appears in reports). Since the syllabus originates with the
court, Kansas decisions will often cite to syllabus paragraphs. See, e.g., Yount v.
Deibert, 147 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Kan. 2006) (citing syllabus paragraph (e.g., Syl. 2)
of precedential case in order to establish standard of review). Ohio, Minnesota
and West Virginia appellate decisions also include court-endorsed syllabi. See
MINN. STAT. § 480.06 (2007) (requiring decisions with headnotes, "briefly stating
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policy premise underlying these various arrangements is clear: The effec-
tive and timely dissemination of precedent is a public responsibility. It is
to discharge that responsibility that statutes authorize the production and
distribution of volumes containing current appellate decisions to judges
and public officials throughout the state, establish measures designed to
assure that they also have access to a full retrospective case law collection,
and provide for the sale of the same law reports at reasonable prices to
individual lawyers, law firms and law libraries.
B. Public Law Libraries
Public involvement in the creation and support of law libraries devel-
oped in rough parallel with the establishment of public law reports, but far
less rapidly or completely.63 Individual nineteenth century lawyers did
have their own libraries, but most lawyers required access to larger collec-
tions than their practice could reasonably support. Judges needed to con-
sult more than the published statutes and case law of their own
jurisdiction. Law reports were swiftly followed by case digests and related
finding aids, treatises and other essential references. The earliest re-
sponse to this collective need took the form of subscription or member-
ship law libraries. The first of these was the Philadelphia Social Law
Library, established in 1802.64 These soon spread to other eastern metro-
politan centers and followed settlement to the West.65 The Leavenworth
Law Library Association of Kansas was established in 1866 with thirty-three
founding members.66 While such libraries, where established, met the
needs of their members, the desire to provide a core collection for the use
of judges and other public officials, as well as lawyers not served by a sub-
scription library, led to the creation of public law libraries. By the early
twentieth century many states had at least authorized systems of state and
the points decided"); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2503.20 (West 2007) ("Whenever a
case is reported for publication, the syllabus of such case shall be prepared by the
judge delivering the opinion, and approved by a majority of the members of the
court."); W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (stating that "it shall be the duty of the court
to prepare a syllabus of the points adjudicated in each case in which an opinion is
written and in which a majority of the justices thereof concurred .... ").
63. See generally Christine A. Brock, Law Libraries and Librarians: A Revisionist
History; or More than you ever wanted to know, 67 LAw LiBR. J. 325, 329-32 (1974)
(discussing development of private and public large-scale law libraries in eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries).
64. See id. at 330 (describing evolution of private law libraries in eastern
cities).
65. See id. at 330-32 (describing openings of private libraries in cities such as
St. Louis and Los Angeles).
66. See Mead & Hoeflich, supra note 44, at 1070 (recounting that members
were required to pay initial fee of twenty dollars and that library was open only to
members).
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county law libraries.6 7 By 1972 there were over 1,000 of these libraries,
including several in Kansas. 68
While public law libraries were appealing in concept, with some con-
spicuous, largely urban exceptions, they never achieved the reach or qual-
ity to which their supporters aspired.69 As a means of assuring that front-
line judges and those appearing before them had adequate legal informa-
tion, this patchwork system was never a great success. As a method of pro-
viding the public with direct access to law, it was an utter failure. Most
public law libraries were neither designed nor intended for that; they
served the public by serving lawyers and judges. 70 Chronic funding diffi-
culties plagued their effectiveness long before online legal information
threatened their viability. As legal publications proliferated and their cost
grew in the second half of the twentieth century, public law libraries in the
areas with the greatest need-thinly resourced and sparsely populated ru-
ral areas-faced crisis conditions. 7 1
C. Commercial Law Reports: The National Reporter System
Public law reports faced funding difficulties too, but a greater threat
came from the private sector in the form of the parallel, commercially
produced case reports that emerged toward the close of the nineteenth
century.7 2 For a brief period there was fierce local and regional competi-
tion among commercial rivals, but by the early twentieth century, there
67. See, e.g., Act to Establish Law Libraries, ch. 225, 1891 Cal. Stat. 430. Cali-
fornia's legislation establishing county law libraries was passed in 1891. COUNCIL
OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY LAw LIBRARIANS, COUNTY LAw LIBRARY TASK FORCE REPORT
5-6 (May 2005), available at http://www.cccll.org/CLLTaskForceReport.pdf (ex-
plaining that bill allowed creation of law libraries statewide, funded through gov-
ernment contributions and portion of civil filling fees). See generally Gail H.
Fruchtman, The History of the Los Angeles County Law Library, 84 LAw LBR. J. 687
(1992); Benjamin Watson, Origins of California's County Law Library System, 81 LAw
LIBR.J. 241 (1989).
68. See Bethany J. Ochal, County Law Libraries, 67 LAw LIBR. J. 177, 180-81
(1974) (illustrating growth of county law libraries nationwide). The present count
in Kansas is eighty-three. See County Law Libraries in Kansas, http://www.law.ku.
edu/library/research/kslawlibs.shtml (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). The Kansas stat-
ute passed in 1967 requires approval by a majority of the lawyers in the county
before a county law library can be established. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3126(b)
(2007). The requirement is understandable since the core funding source is an
annual registration fee paid by local lawyers. See id. § 20-3126(c).
69. See Brock, supra note 63, at 335, 338 (describing failure of many state and
county governments to establish law libraries appealing to nongovernment attor-
neys and the public at large).
70. Cf at 334-37 (describing role, development and difficulties of public
county and state law libraries).
71. See, e.g., Peter W. Martin, Neutral Citation, Court Web Sites, and Access to Au-
thoritative Case Law, 99 LAw LIBR.J. 329, 17 (2007) (describing county law library
crisis and ensuing debate in Oklahoma over creation of public legal database,
which eventually came into being in 1997).
72. SeeJessen, supra note 49, at 34 (describing beginning of private law report
publication).
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had emerged a single, powerfully attractive alternative to public law re-
ports: West Publishing Company's National Reporter System. This series
of regionally compiled state reports initially pushed public law reporters to
expand and improve their editorial additions, to move decisions to print
with greater speed, to publish advance sheets if they had not before and to
conform advance sheet pagination to the pagination that would ultimately
appear in the bound volume. 73 The public entities responsible for law
report production and distribution were, however, all too often prevented
from matching West's performance because of limited funds, insufficient
and often less competent staff, inferior printing technology and general
legal constraints on public contracts and sales.7 4 Typically, they had no
pricing flexibility.75
Importantly, most states were unable to reprint back volumes during
periods when a growing legal profession and judiciary created demand for
complete retrospective sets.7 6 Supreme Court copyright decisions effec-
tively blocked state efforts to reserve or grant exclusive publication
rights. 7 7 As a result, West Publishing Company traveled an unimpeded
path in producing its comprehensive national series of reports. Courts
commonly insisted that those citing precedent to them refer to the volume
and page numbers in the state's "official reports," but West was free to
insert those citation parameters in its volumes when they were available
before the West reports went to press and to provide cross-reference tables
when they were not.78 This enabled users of the National Reporter System
to cite to official reports without acquiring or otherwise securing access to
them.
73. See id. at 34-37 (describing innovations made in West's National Reporter
System between 1876 and 1900).
74. See id. at 34 (observing that increased volume of decisions toward end of
nineteenth century, not matched by corresponding growth in public funding for
law reports, caused publicly produced reports to fall further and further behind).
At the time West launched its Northwestern Reporter in 1879, all seven of the
states it covered were "several years tardy in publishing opinions." Id. at 35.
75. See KENDALL F. SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER's GUIDE & REFER-
ENCE MANUAL 68 (2006) [hereinafter SVENGALls 2006] (noting that legal con-
straints under which state agencies operate created particular problems for pricing
of back volumes which inevitably compete with used books).
76. SeeJessen, supra note 49, at 36-37 (describing increased demand for retro-
spective publication and various private sector solutions to meet it).
77. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888) (validating copyrights of head-
notes, statements of fact and other matter not prepared by judge); Banks v.
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) (invalidating copyright of judicial opinions by
state reporter on ground that opinions are public property); Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. 591 (1834) (rejecting reporter's claim to copyright in Supreme Court deci-
sions). See generally L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope
of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv.
719, 731-39 (1989) (summarizing early Supreme Court cases and copyright doc-
trines developed in each).
78. SeeJessen, supra note 49, at 35. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest
that some commentators preferred citation to the National Reporter System, as it
was more widely available than a state's official reports. See id.
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D. Unpublished Appellate Decisions
With the exception of West's reports covering the lower federal
courts, the National Reporter System did not compete by publishing opin-
ions that those producing public law reports had not themselves selected
for publication. For most states, at the turn of the twentieth century, that
simply entailed publishing all decisions rendered with full opinions by the
jurisdiction's highest court. As noted earlier, these were not necessarily all
decisions.79 Some appeals were disposed of summarily, with little or no
explanation. Lacking detailed explication, these summary dispositions
were, even when noted in law reports, of no value as precedent. And in
some states, Kansas being one, public law reports were not required to
include all supreme court opinions, but instead only those the court
"deemed important."80
During the formative years of public law reports, only the federal judi-
ciary and a handful of states had multi-level appellate structures, with an
intermediate appellate court placed between the jurisdiction's trial courts
and its court of last resort. During the latter half of the twentieth century,
however, growing caseloads led more and more states to adopt this
model. 8 1 Kansas did so in 1977. By the dawn of the digital age, approxi-
mately three-quarters of the states had intermediate appellate courts. 82
Decisions of these intermediate courts were fed into the law report systems
(state and commercial), but only a fraction of them. Most states setting up
intermediate appellate courts specified that only selected decisions from
this judicial layer should be published. 83 Within the federal judicial struc-
ture, the move to selective publication of U.S. Court of Appeals decisions
also began, or at least became a significant and acknowledged practice, in
the latter half of the twentieth century. 84 Decisions withheld from public
79. See supra note 55-57 and accompanying text.
80. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-205 (2007) (describing criteria to be considered by
state reporter in selecting cases for publication).
81. See MEADOR, supra note 8, at 5, 11-12 (explaining that while multi-level
appellate systems first appeared at end of nineteenth century, they did not become
widespread in states until second half of twentieth century).
82. See State Court Organization, supra note 8, Table 1, at 9-11 (summarizing
appellate court structures in all fifty states).
83. See MEADOR, supra note 8, at 59 (describing strong trend towards nonpub-
lication of appellate decisions). The creation of intermediate appellate courts and
selective publication were viewed as complementary measures for dealing with an
appellate caseload crisis. See I THE ADVIsORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, AP-
PELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, at 6-7, 10-11 (1975). In 1973 the Advisory Council for Ap-
pellate Justice circulated a model rule setting forth strict standards for publication
of appellate decisions that proved influential. See V THE ADvasORY COUNCIL FOR
APPELLATE JUSTICE, APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, at 128-29 (1975); RobertJ. Martineau,
Restrictions on Publication and Citation ofJudicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 119, 122-25 (1994) (restating findings of Advisory Council report re-
garding limited publication).
84. See MarthaJ. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a
Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 761 (1995) (explaining that within several
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law reports under such policies were listed in West's National Reporter
System (as so-called "table cases"), but not printed in full. The decision
not to publish an opinion effectively kept it out of both the official and
commercial precedent distribution channels. Being invisible, it could not
operate as precedent.
With few exceptions, invisibility was the fate of all trial court deci-
sions. 85 In those few jurisdictions where some were published, the criteria
for publication were stringent and the allotted space severely limited.
8 6
Here too, West Publishing Company's National Reporter System simply
tracked the official reports. West's decision to publish selected decisions
of the U.S. District Courts in a Federal Supplement reporter and the more
focused Federal Rules Decisions demonstrated that trial court decisions had
value for bench and bar.8 7 That value was also reflected in sustained local
publication of trial court decisions in a few states.8 8 But jurisdiction-wide
publication of even selected trial court opinions was a rarity.
E. The Disappearance of Independent State-Published Reports
In time, competition from West's National Reporter System led many
states to cease publishing their own reports. 89 As federal law and decisions
climbed in importance, and national commerce and interstate activity of
years of the 1964 Judicial Conference of United States, all federal circuit courts
had adopted rules on unpublished opinions); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunc-
tions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435, 1442-44
(2004) (describing late twentieth century efforts to increase proportion of unpub-
lished opinions, largely justified by claims of increased efficiency).
85. Three states that publish selected trial court decisions are Connecticut,
New York and Ohio. See, e.g., BLUEBOOK, supra note 48, tbl.T.1, at 203, 221, 226.
86. See New York State Law Reporting Bureau, Selection of Opinions for Publication,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/Selection.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
Under New York Judiciary Law § 431, the New York Law Reporting Bureau is au-
thorized to publish any lower court decision it "considers worthy of being reported
because of its usefulness as a precedent or its importance as a matter of public
interest." Id. (quoting N.Y. JUD. LAw § 431 (McKinney 2007)). Currently, the Bu-
reau selects approximately 600 decisions in this category each year (roughly one in
six submitted). See id. A good number of those not selected for print publication
are now placed online by the Bureau. See id.
87. When West Publishing Co. launched the Federal Reporter in 1880, both
U.S. District Courts and Circuit Courts were trial courts. With the creation of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals in 1891, volumes of the Federal Reporter included the new
courts' decisions together with those of the U.S. District Courts; West also offered
its opinions in a separate series: The Circuit Courts of Appeals Reports. See SURRENCY,
supra note 46, at 70-71. It was only in 1932 that federal trial court decisions were
diverted to the separate Federal Supplement. See id. at 71.
88. See, e.g., BLUEBOOK, supra note 48, tbl.T.1, at 229. Pennsylvania's county
law reports and legal journals such as the Bucks County Law Reporter are an example.
A commercial series entitled Pennsylvania District & County Reports has been in con-
tinuous publication since 1921. See id.
89. See SURRENCY, supra note 46, at 57-58 (describing trend, since World War
II, of states ceasing publication of reports due to success of West's National Re-
porter System).
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all kinds expanded through the first half of the twentieth century, judges
and lawyers increasingly needed access to the multijurisdiction coverage
of the West reports. Public reports seemed a costly redundancy, even
when they were timely and well done. West had a strong reputation for
accuracy and offered a full information package with which few states
could compete: advance sheets, bound reports and digests that were in
many cases far swifter to arrive, a system of summarizing and headnoting
that strung decisions on the same issue together, not only within ajurisdic-
tion, but beyond. Where the market warranted, the company was more
than ready to produce a single state offprint from its regional reporter so
that courts, lawyers and the libraries serving them did not have to acquire
case law of other jurisdictions along with each full set of local precedent.
Beginning with Florida in 1948,90 a parade of states, including three-
quarters of those immediately adjoining Kansas, joined the lower federal
courts in ceding all law report publication to West.9 ' The step reduced
public payrolls and moved states out of the business of storing and distrib-
uting law books. It also shifted the judiciary as well as all other units of
state government into a totally dependent posture: buyer of the state's
own precedent from a single source.
By the mid-1990s, nearly half the states openly relied on West for their
law reports. Others quit law report publication less conspicuously and in
some cases less completely. The Pennsylvania State Reports, prepared by a
state reporter, reach back in an unbroken sequence of volumes to 1845.92
For over thirty years, however, they have been prepared and published by
West (now Thomson). Volume 458 was prepared by Joseph W. Marshall,
State Reporter, and published under his supervision. Marshall retired in
1974. Volume 459 was published by West and included the summaries
and headnotes prepared by its editors for the Atlantic Reporter. The pattern
continues to this day. Similar shifts to what might be called officially sanc-
tioned commercial publication took place in other states, which, viewed
from a distance, would appear to have maintained independent produc-
tion of their own reports. 93
90. See Oasis Publ. Co. v. West Publ. Co., 924 F. Supp. 918, 920 (D. Minn.
1996) (explaining evolution of Florida courts' relationships with West). With the
cessation of the Florida Reports, the Florida Supreme Court declared West's South-
ern Reporter the "official publication" of its decisions. See id. West proceeded at
once to produce a Southern Reporter offprint entitled lorida Cases. See id. Years
later, the legislature codified the relationship in a statute, still in effect, which
states, "The reports of the opinions of the Supreme Court and the district courts of
appeal shall be known as Florida Cases." FLA. STAT. § 25.381 (2007).
91. See BLUEBOOK, supra note 48, tbl.T.1, at 202, 216, 227 (listing reporters for
Colorado, Missouri and Oklahoma, respectively). The Oklahoma Reports ended in
1953, the Missouri Reports in 1956 and the Colorado Reports in 1980. See id.
92. See BLUEBOOK, supra note 48, tbl.T.1, at 229.
93. See Telephone Interview with Marcia Koslov, Library Director, Los Angeles
County Law Library and Wisconsin State Law Librarian, 1974-2000 (Oct. 8, 2006).
Wisconsin stopped contracting for production of the Wisconsin Reports in 1975, but
Callaghan, later Lawyer's Coop, and still later Thomson / West, continued the
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Even in those states that have continued to supervise production of
their own law reports, less and less of the work is performed inhouse. To-
day, Kansas is unusual in handling the editorial, production and distribu-
tion process from start to finish. The prevailing approach is to contract
out the latter functions, while retaining ultimate editorial control. Faced
with budget cutbacks, state law reporters have cut back on staff and out-
sourced editorial functions they once carried out themselves.
94
To conclude, by the end of the twentieth century, public control over
and responsibility for the distribution of precedent had been severely com-
promised by the effectiveness and market dominance of a single system of
commercial law reports. And, in part as a consequence, the judiciary's
need for law reports had in most jurisdictions led to a deep level of depen-
dence on the proprietary methods and format of that system of reports.
West was not reluctant to remind states of their dependency, and did so as
it deemed necessary.
9 5
III. THE ARRIvAL OF VIRTUAL LAW REPORTS AND VIRTUAL LAW LIBRARIES
A. Lexis and Westlaw
It was only a decade ago that a serious alternative to libraries of print
law reports became available to judges, lawyers and others in the United
States.9 6 Although the two major online services (LexisNexis and
Westlaw) date back to the 1970s, they served as case-finding tools for most
of their history. They supplemented but did not substitute for print re-
ports. In their infancy, both were costly proof-of-concept services with seri-
ous scope limitations. 97 Launched in 1969, Lexis was, by 1976, offering
federal case law reaching back fifty-one years for the Supreme Court,
thirty-one years for the U.S. Courts of Appeals and sixteen years for the
series without interruption as Callaghan's Wisconsin Reports. At the point when Cal-
laghan no longer had a contract with the state, West asked that its Northwestern
Reporter be designated the "official reports" of state decisions. Rather than make a
choice between Callaghan and West, the state supreme court labeled both of them
as "official." Id. The rule doing so imposed and still imposes the condition that
the Wisconsin Reports be entitled "Callaghan's Wisconsin Reports," no doubt to
signal their proprietary nature. See Wis. Sup. CT. R. 80.03. The rules also speak of
Wisconsin Reports as a publication of Lawyers Cooperative Publishing. See Wisc. Sup.
CT. R. 80.01. Neither Callaghan nor Lawyers Cooperative Publishing exists today.
Thomson acquired both publishing entities prior to its purchase of the West Pub-
lishing Company. That acquisition brought both sets of Wisconsin "official re-
ports" into the hands of a single publisher, Thomson / West.
94. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 48 (describing recent changes to publication of
Washington state appellate decisions).
95. During the early 1990s, West reportedly threatened state courts consider-
ing citation schemes to which it was opposed that it might omit elements on which
those plans depended from its reports.
96. See generally William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal
Research, 77 LAw LIBR. J. 543 (1985) (describing how Lexis and Westlaw came into
being, their capabilities and their limitations).
97. See id. (same).
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District Courts.9 8 But its state materials were meager-comprehensive but
chronologically thin collections for nine states, plus a selection of Dela-
ware corporate law decisions.9 9 At roughly $125 per hour, this package
drew few subscribers.1 00 Westlaw in these early days avoided any risk of
displacing West's print publications by offering only headnotes. 1° 1 Its
depth was eight years for the states and fifteen years for federal cases.
0 2
By the mid-1980s, a Lexis threat to add star pagination to its case data,
keyed to West's National Reporter System, raised the prospect of research-
ers working mostly, if not totally, from electronic versions of the print
volumes. That provoked a West copyright suit.1 0 3 By the time the parties
settled their litigation in 1988 with a cross-licensing agreement-allowing
Lexis (at a heavy price) to insert West pagination in its database-Westlaw
had itself added pagination. In the meantime, access to both systems had
moved from large terminal and printer installations in libraries, first to
desktop terminals and then to PCs with modems. 1114 The scope of their
collections had been expanded; both held reported cases from all fifty
states. Limited historic depth, however, still forced researchers to the
books for older cases. Lexis reached back at least to 1965 for all states,
further for some like New York (1940), California (1945) and its home
state of Ohio (1921).105 Westlaw's retrospective coverage was compara-
ble.' 0 6 By 1989 both Lexis and Westlaw featured online cite-checking.
10 7
Around the same time, both companies declared their intent to provide
full fifty-state statutory coverage.
0 8
98. JAMES A. SPROwL, A MANUAL FOR COMPUTER-AssISTED LEGAL RESEARCH 11
(1976).
99. Id. at 11-12.
100. See id. at 8-9 n.22 (reporting "close to 200 subscribers" in 1976).
101. Cf id. at 55 (explaining that Westlaw established online research tool "as
a by-product of its publishing activities").
102. See id. at 57; Harrington, supra note 96, at 553 (describing comprehen-
sive, but limited coverage of Westlaw in 1976).
103. See West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1221-22 (8th
Cir. 1986) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction halting Lexis's use of star
pagination).
104. SeeJOHN E. KINSOCK, LEGAL DATABASES ONLINE: LEXIS & WESTLAW 2, 4,
77-78 (1985) (describing procedures for use of Lexis and Westlaw terminals and
predicting eventual adoption of software for use on personal computers).
105. See id. at 81-89 (listing statutes, cases and other materials accessible
through Lexis by 1985).
106. See id. at 90-99 (listing statutes, cases and other materials accessible
through Westlaw by 1985).
107. With Lexis this feature was called "Auto-Cite" and was licensed from Law-
yer's Coop. See KATHLEEN M. CARRICK, LEXIS: A LEGAL RESEARCH MANUAL 101-03
(1989) (explaining Lexis's auto-cite feature). Westlaw's cite-checker was named
"Insta-Cite."
108. See FRED R. SHAPIRO, LEXIS: THE COMPLETE USER'S GUIDE 164 (1989)
(indicating that at date of publication Lexis was in process of compiling "'fifty-state
statute build' [comprised of] all the state codes online, as well as codes for the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands").
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It was not until the mid- to late 1990s that these systems attained suffi-
cient scope and functionality to become comprehensive research environ-
ments-virtual libraries-rather than simply places to begin case research.
A series of changes, due largely to external developments and pressures,
led to online case reports becoming not only a plausible substitute for the
print originals, but a compelling (albeit still costly) alternative. In the
early 1990s, competition from CD-ROM-based legal research products
spurred several key software improvements. One was the hyperlink refer-
ence, standard in early law CD-ROMs, but difficult to transplant onto the
character-based, non-scrolling terminal interface with which Lexis and
Westlaw users had to cope. Lexis first employed "link markers" set off in
brackets adjacent to citations (e.g., <=160>). To follow such a reference,
the user had to key in the bracketed formula (e.g., "=160").109 Link mark-
ers eventually morphed into link tokens to which a user could jump by
striking the tab key.110 Finally, as lawyers and judges migrated (ever so
slowly) to a Windows interface, link markers became links operated by
means of a mouse.
Links made it far easier to leap from one text to another than had
ever been possible in print. Even so, online research systems remained
dramatically inferior to print as a reading environment or print source.
First, reading an online case on a PC required the reader to page through
the case screenful by screenful. Moreover, downloading proceeded in sim-
ilarly small increments, and generating print copies was both clumsy and
often inadequate. By contrast, CD-ROM case law products permitted users
to extract cases formatted as word-processor documents.
While Westlaw and Lexis eventually responded, 11' scrolling up or
down through the full text of an opinion and saving or printing it in its
entirety only became fully possibly in 1998 once both systems moved to the
World Wide Web and a standard Web browser (rather than proprietary
software) interface. 112 This new WYSIWYG window on decisions required
109. See LEXIS-NEXIS: THE LEGAL BASICS 34 (1995).
110. Westlaw was the initiator here with its 'JUMP" feature. See DISCOVERING
WESTLAW: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE 10 (2d ed. 1992).
111. See, e.g., JEAN SINCLAJR McKNIGHT, THE LEXIS COMPANION: A COMPLETE
GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE SEARCHING 131-32 (1995) (discussing steps taken by Lexis to
improve quality of printed product). With respect to Lexis, these responses came
in the form of software known as "LEXFORM," which removed both the "hard
returns" responsible for irregular formatting and the headers that separated each
screen of text from the next. See id.
112. See DISCOVERING WESTLAW: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE 4 (8th ed. 1998);
David Beckman & David Hirsch, Don't Duck This Web Feat: With Lexis and Westlaw on
the Internet, Access to Research Opens Up, 84 A.B.A.J. 86, 86 (1998) (recognizing nov-
elty of Lexis and Westlaw internet presence and discussing convenient features
offered by both services online). Although the systems became accessible via the
Web, many experienced users were slow to switch, and both Lexis and Westlaw
continued to offer access via the old and more limited dedicated interfaces. See
Hope Viner Samborn, While Publishing Giants Lexis and Westlaw Race For the Internet
Market, Smaller Firms Tail Close Behind, 85 A.B.A. J. 75, 78 (1999) (recounting Lexis
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Internet access at sufficient bandwidth to allow opinions to be delivered in
full, rather than screen-sized chunks. Moreover, the shift required major
investments in both software and data throughout what by then had be-
come quite large systems. Neither database had been built with the de-
mands or potential of this new environment in mind.' 13
B. New Players in This New Environment
At roughly the same time that Westlaw and Lexis were successfully
putting case law research on the desktops of lawyers practicing in large
firms, new players with new business models were beginning to bring elec-
tronic case law within the budgets of small firm lawyers. Here too, CD-
ROM technology was an important catalyst. Throughout the early 1990s,
Westlaw and Lexis offered more than most small firm lawyers needed, at
prices they could not afford. Both companies charged in ways that made
their services unattractive to those making repeated use of a single state's
cases and statutes. In 1995, Law Office Information Systems (LOIS) began
selling state-specific CD-ROMs for a flat price of $600 per year.1 14
By 2000, a striking array of less costly research options was available to
U.S. lawyers. All were specifically designed and priced for attorneys prac-
ticing in small firms. LOIS-by then Loislaw-had moved to the Internet
and expanded to all fifty states. In some jurisdictions, Loislaw was under-
priced by small CD-ROM publishers. VersusLaw, another online research
alternative, offered a national online case law library priced at only $83.40
per year for a solo practitioner.' 15 Lexis and Westlaw had themselves cre-
ated fixed rate plans designed and priced specifically for small firms. 16
and Westlaw's transition to Internet and noting that some veteran lawyers pre-
ferred DOS-based proprietary software).
113. See Linnea Christiani, Meeting the New Challenges at West and LexisNexis:
Post-SIlA Summit Interviews with Michael Wilens and Lisa Mitnick, SEARCHER, May 1,
2002, at 68-69 (outlining Westlaw's efforts to convert propriety software to large
servers). The transition also required a fresh editorial investment. Consider ital-
ics, which are often used for emphasis within opinions. Because italics could not
be presented using the original terminal and printer technology, italics had not
been encoded in cases digitized by West and Mead Data Central. This can still be
seen in scattered portions of both systems. Other elements of typography not rep-
resented in early Westlaw or Lexis data were strike-through and underlining,
which have traditionally been used to show amended text. See, e.g., Denver by Bd.
of Water Comm'rs v. Vail Valley Consol. Water Dist., 751 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. 1988)
(failing to show strike-through of phrase "Meadow Creek" in original); Woodard v.
Pa. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 534 So.2d 716, 719 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (utilizing underline
to indicate amendment to text of statute).
114. KENDALL F. SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER'S GUIDE & REFERENCE
MANUAL 125 (1996).
115. See KENDALL F. SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER'S GUIDE & REFER-
ENCE MANUAL 111 (2001).
116. See, e.g., STEVEN L. EMANUEL, LEXIS FOR LAW STUDENTS, at 1-26 (1994)
(explaining Lexis initiatives designed to make Lexis/Nexis more accessible to
smaller practices). Lexis led the way with its "Most Valuable Part of Lexis" (MVP)
program, which offered a low-rate, unlimited-use plan to customers that primarily
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By then, public, non-profit and advertising-supported sites had begun pro-
vidingjudicial opinions and other legal documents over the Internet with-
out charge.
More recently, state bar organizations have become major players in
the case law dissemination picture, contracting on behalf of their mem-
bers with a still newer set of commercial providers. The "Casemaker" con-
sortium, established by the Ohio Bar Association and a small electronic
publisher, is leading this development. Bar groups joining the consortium
provide Casemaker's online service to their members without charge.
Currently, Casemaker claims twenty-eight state bar association mem-
bers. 1 7 The Kansas State Bar is a recent addition to the group, having
introduced this service to its membership in late 2006.118
Fastcase, another recent entrant, also uses this business model (as well
as a search engine that has learned some lessons from Google). 1 19 In the
past three years, Fastcase has signed up ten state bar associations, plus a
number of local or specialty bar associations and membership libraries. 120
As the legal information market sped through these rapid changes,
networked computers moved to the desktops of nearly all lawyers and
judges, providing them with writing spaces, communication channels, and
scheduling and management tools. Print publishing itself was trans-
formed. Once courts began producing opinions on computers, compa-
nies that published print law reports sought and acquired access to
electronic rather than hard copy versions of those opinions. Electronic
publishers, including the new entrants, pressed for the same.
The cumulative result of these developments is a fully electronic legal
research environment that is quite new. As recently as 1995, lawyers, espe-
cially those a decade or more out of law school, relied heavily on printed
reports when researching case law. 12' Today, virtually all writing by law-
utilized Lexis for legal research within a single state. See id. (discussing MVP pro-
gram); see generally Martin, supra note 71, 73-74 (discussing MVP program and
noting that Lexis offered plan through state bar associations).
117. See SVENGALIS 2006, supra note 75, at 148 (providing comprehensive list
of state bar association clients). The State Bar of North Dakota brought the
Casemaker count to twenty-eight in the summer of 2007. See Casemaker, http://
www.sband.org/sband_blast/082207/casemakerinfo.pdf (last visited Dec. 7,
2007).
118. See Kansas Bar Association Joins Casemaker Database (Feb. 9, 2006),
http://www.ksbar.org/public/kba/2006_news/casemaker.shtml (recounting Kan-
sas State bar announcement to join Casemaker Database).
119. See Fastcase, Product Overview, http://www.fastcase.com/Corporate/
Product.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
120. E-mail from Philip Rosenthal, President, Fastcase, Inc., to author (Oct. 4,
2007) (on file with author). See generally Alan Cooper, Fastcase Awarded Contract by
Virginia State Bar, VA. LAWYERS WKLY., Feb. 6, 2006 (discussing newly formed con-
tract between Fastcase and Virginia State Bar Association).
121. See Donna M. Bergsgaard & William H. Lindberg, A Dissenting View, in
TASK FORCE ON CITATION FORMATS, AM. Ass'N OF LAw LIBRARIES, FINAL REPORT
(1995), reprinted in 87 LAw LIBR.J. 580, 609 (1995) ("While slightly more than half
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yers and judges-whether memoranda, briefs or judicial opinions-is
composed and revised on a computer. Most case law research is done on a
computer as well. Quotations are copied from digital sources, rather than
rekeyed. Lawyers, young and old, write briefs without ever pulling a law
report volume from the shelf. Libraries pressed for shelf space and funds
have ceased acquiring new volumes122 and even sought to rid themselves
of old ones. 12
3
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC AND COSTLY STATUS QUO
Despite the recent dramatic change in how precedent is accessed and
the accompanying increase in the number of alternative distribution chan-
nels, case law remains confined by concepts and practices rooted in print
law reports. Although understandable, those constraints are the source of
serious negative consequences. First, the widespread failure of courts to
adjust to the new electronic reality casts large (though diffuse) costs upon
the nation's judicial systems, the legal profession and the public. Further-
more, so long as digital dissemination of precedent is subordinated to
print, important changes made possible by the new technology cannot be
realized. Kansas is illustrative of many of these costs and frustrated
opportunities.
A. Costs or Inefficiencies Resulting from the Continued Dominance of Print
Concepts and Practices
1. Citation Norms Still Dependent on Print
In most U.S. jurisdictions, precedent must still be cited to print re-
ports-those of the National Reporter System and in states like Kansas,
where they continue to be produced, public reports as well. Decisions of
Kansas courts and briefs submitted to them are required to cite state pre-
cedent using the following format: Lawless v. Cedar Vale Regional Hosp.,
of the [Wisconsin] bar now use computers to some extent in legal research, the
remaining 45% are using printed sources exclusively.").
122. See S. Blair Kauffman, Rededication Symposia: Evolving Technology and Law
Library Planning: Technology and Law Library Design, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 163, 169
(1996) (noting that academic law libraries had begun to remove duplicate primary
materials available online); see also Donald J. Dunn, Why Legal Research Skills De-
clined, or When Two Rights Make a Wrong, 85 LAw LIBR.J. 49, 60 (1993) (commenting
on shift to computerized legal research and hypothesizing that volume of online
material would soon surpass volume of printed material).
123. See Kansas Reports Available, http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/
kansasattorneys-1/msg00756.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). In March 2003 the
following appeared on several law listservs:
Washburn University Law Library has several sets of Kansas Reports avail-
able for sale. We seek to dispose of these items by April 15, 2003.
For further information please see http://washburnlaw.edu/library/used
books/
Thanks for your interest.- Martin Wisneski
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252 Kan. 1064, 1072-73, 850 P.2d 795 (1993). The writer must adhere to
this format despite having found and read the opinion using Westlaw,
Lexis, Casemaker or some other digital source. Because Westlaw (the on-
line system used by Kansas appellate courts) provides "star pagination" to
the state's "official" set of reports, the pinpoint or specific passage refer-
ence need employ only the pagination of the Kansas Reports. Nevertheless,
the system's dependence on volume and page numbers inevitably pro-
duces a significant period during which any case citation must be incom-
plete or temporary.
While decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of
Appeals are available on a public website from the day of their release,
three to four weeks pass before these cases receive their volume and page
number assignments in the National Reporter System on Westlaw. Indi-
viduals relying on the print advance sheets must wait several weeks longer.
Another three months pass before decisions acquire their official Kansas
Reports or Kansas Court of Appeals Reports citations, or at least before those
citations are added to Westlaw and Lexis.
Lawyers, judges and legal scholars have, of course, coped with this
"citation lag" for as long as law reports have existed. What has changed is
that the Internet, and specifically court websites, have at once given the
problem greater salience and offered a straightforward solution.124 Fur-
thermore, the number of electronic distribution channels has quite liter-
ally multiplied both the inconvenience and cost of retrofitting print-
derived citation information on opinions weeks and months after their
release. Citation retrofitting is a redundant task that each electronic pub-
lisher is compelled to perform. The burden reinforces the market posi-
tion of the more established and expensive online systems. Through a
variety of means, the larger companies are able to gain and apply print
citations to their case data with greater speed and economy than their
smaller competitors. To eliminate the citation lag and the costs and con-
sequent barriers to greater competition, Kansas (as well as thirty-odd other
states and the federal courts) simply need to do what over a dozen states
have already done: implement a system of court-attached citation that
does not depend on where a decision is ultimately placed in one or more
sets of print law reports or the decision's designation in a commercial
database.
On April 10, 2007, the North Dakota Supreme Court released seven
opinions. A month later they had all been assigned volume and page
numbers in the National Reporter System. These parameters were first
displayed in Westlaw. They appeared in Lexis shortly thereafter. Slowly,
each opinion's print-derived numbers rippled through the other online
124. Because of the publication lag, judges often cite using placeholders rely-
ing on the reporter or publisher to fill them in subsequently. When the Kansas
Supreme Court decided State v. Drennan, 101 P.3d 1218 (Kan. 2004) on December
17, the court had to cite its decision of the same date, State v. Hurt, as "278 Kan.
- P.3d (2004)."
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services. From the day of release and forever thereafter, however, all of
those opinions could be cited using a system illustrated by the following
citation: Odden v. Rath, 2007 ND 51, 1 18.
Because this method of reference is based on the year, court, decision
and paragraph number, and because each component is embedded in the
opinion by the court, Odden could readily be cited from the moment the
decision was available on the court website and in Lexis, Westlaw,
Casemaker or any other source. Any researcher can use Odden's medium-
neutral, non-print-dependent, non-proprietary citation to retrieve the case
from the same range of sources and proceed directly to the cited passage.
So long as citation information and other revisions are added after a
decision's initial release and are authoritatively implemented by only one
of several disseminators, all other publishers must, in one way or another,
secure that data and incorporate it into their versions of the same deci-
sions. This necessity injects wasteful expense, time lag and risk of error
into the business of electronic law publishing. Moreover, in the case of
proprietary pagination, a publisher faces licensing costs or litigation
risks. 12
5
2. Publicly Accessible Digital Opinions: Neither Official Nor Final
Citation norms are not the only factors that tie Kansas precedent to
print. Kansas appellate courts release their "published" opinions on a
website that carries this notice:
Slip opinions [as those at the site are denominated] . .. are sub-
ject to modification orders and editorial corrections prior to pub-
lication in the official reporters. Consult the bound volumes of
Kansas Reports and Kansas Court of Appeals Reports for the final,
official texts of the opinions of the Kansas Supreme Court and
the Kansas Court of Appeals.126
Thus, because the print reports remain the official dissemination path,
opinions may be subjected to both editorial and even substantive revision
during the lengthy period prior to final publication in the final bound
125. See Comments of the Department of Justice Before the Committee on
Automation and Technology, Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Mar. 14, 1997),
available at http://www.hyperlaw.com/jccite/346.txt. The Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice stated in 1997:
Even if [competitors] . . . may star paginate to West's reporters without
having to pay a royalty, star pagination is not costless. It still entails the
expense of accurately ascertaining where page breaks fall in West's
volumes, and accurately incorporating that information in another prod-
uct. This process unnecessarily consumes resources which could be more
efficiently employed to make a better or less costly product.
Id.
126. See generally Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeals Opin-
ions, available at http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 7, 2007).
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volumes. This notice warns both users and publishers that the publicly
accessible versions of opinions distributed on the Internet are not subse-
quently conformed to the final, revised official print versions. To date,
relatively few states have acknowledged the importance of minimizing
post-release revision and of posting changes to opinions on their public
websites when such changes are made. 127
3. The Risk of Inconsistent Versions
Print may be the "official" channel for Kansas precedent, but most
lawyers and judges in the state and elsewhere draw case law from one of
the competing virtual libraries. The judiciary's failure to release appellate
decisions electronically in an official, final and citable form gives rise to an
indeterminate risk that those online versions may be inconsistent. Fur-
thermore, there is no readily available means of verifying the accuracy of a
critical passage, other than tracking down a copy of the "official" print
report.
The judges and staff of the Kansas Supreme Court and the Kansas
Court of Appeals use Westlaw. 128 While contracting practices and licens-
ing terms vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, appellate courts across the
United States provide their judges, clerks and other legal staff with sub-
scriptions to Westlaw, Lexis or both. The same is not uniformly true for
the trial courts beneath them.
In Kansas, the state's 105 counties are individually responsible for
funding library and electronic legal research services for Kansas district
courts. Because those counties vary enormously in scale and resources,
the online research services available to the state's trial judges range from
Westlaw or Lexis to none at all. 129 State monies continue to dispatch cop-
ies of Kansas Reports and Kansas Court of Appeals Reports to all district judges,
but there is no effective assurance that the district judges, or the lawyers
appearing before them, will have access to a collection of Kansas prece-
dent as complete, accurate and up-to-date as the collection in the hands of
the appellate judges who establish it.
127. See Martin, supra note 71, 26-27 (explaining that some states revise
online versions of cases after release, but most simply warn users that online ver-
sions are not final). Some states have realized the importance of timely revisions
and immediate disclosure over the Internet of any necessary revisions to opinions.
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 71, 29 (discussing editorial practices adopted by
Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota and Oklahoma). The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals tags opinions at its website once they have been through editorial review and
forwarded to the publisher of its "official reports." See Michigan Court of Ap-
peals-Court Opinions, http://courtofappeals.mijud.net/resources/opinions.htm
(last visited Dec. 7, 2007) (explaining process of posting opinions before and after
review by Editor's Office). At that point, the final version is substituted for the
original slip opinion. Id.
128. Telephone interview with Jack Fowler, Executive Assistant and Counsel
to Chief Justice Kay McFarland, Kansas Supreme Court (Feb. 1, 2007).
129. Id.
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Lawyers in Kansas, like those across the country, constitute a complex
market. Their decisions regarding online services vary according to the
type and prosperity of their practice, and the size and location of their
firm. But there is now a baseline. Like lawyers in a majority of states,
Kansas state bar association members have access to Casemaker, at no ad-
ditional charge. For these attorneys, Casemaker has replaced the county
law library collection of law reports. This development renders all the
more problematic the lack of an official digital source from which
Casemaker or any other online service can draw or against which it can
authenticate the text of Kansas decisions.
4. The Temptation to Trade Privileged Data Access or Official Status for
Online Services
While courts produce case law, they are, by a large factor, net consum-
ers of legal information. By bestowing "official status" on one set of print
reports (and their digital derivatives), and in a variety of less obvious ways,
court systems can-and more than a few do-grant one commercial pro-
vider favored access in return for discounts on bills for legal information
(both online and in print), editorial and technology support, and even
cash.
While Kansas publishes its own official reports, a majority of states
outsource the activity. Over the past decade, contracts for official report
publication have become increasingly concentrated in two companies:
Thomson / West and LexisNexis. These contracts afford the successful
bidder with unique access to digital formats of final decision texts, edito-
rial enhancements and official citation data. In states such as California,
New York and Ohio, where the demand for legal information is high, re-
port publication contracts have become a mechanism for extracting sub-
stantial benefits for the judiciary, including free or discounted use of the
publisher's online system. 13 0
Absent such a publishing contract, the judiciary's online service sub-
scription agreement itself can provide a framework for exchanging judi-
cial assistance in data acquisition for favorable use terms. The Westlaw
contract with the Kansas appellate courts contains a "non-disclosure" pro-
vision.1 31 Thus, there is no sure way to determine whether the contract's
price terms are tied to judicial cooperation with Thomson's production of
the Pacific Reports, or to judicial delivery of certain Kansas data to Westlaw.
Such provisions do exist in Thomson's contracts with other states. 13 2
130. See Martin, supra note 71, 45-49 (discussing benefits obtained by large
state court systems under their official report publication deals). The benefits en-joyed by large states such as California and New York were such that neither state
supported adoption of competition-friendly, neutral citation forms. See id.
131. Telephone interview with Jack Fowler, Executive Assistant and Counsel
to Chief Justice Kay McFarland, Kansas Supreme Court (Feb. 1, 2007).
132. See, e.g., Letter from Ann S. Koto, State Law Librarian, Hawaii, to author
(Feb. 5, 2007) (on file with author) ("[C]ontract amount is tied in with the courts'
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Bundled with "official report" services, both Thomson / West and
LexisNexis are prepared to provide states with a free and "open-to-the-
public" case law site. They do so, however, on terms that prevent competi-
tors from drawing data from the site or lawyers from using it
professionally. 13
3
5. Market Dominance Reinforced, Competition Inhibited
The continued link between precedent and print harms small legal
publishers and reinforces the market positions of the two dominant legal
information vendors, Thomson / West and Reed Elsevere. Thomson /
West utilizes a century of judicial and professional acceptance of its Na-
tional Reporter System, and the resulting network effects to maintain its
leading position in the market for online legal information. Users are
drawn and held by the system's consistency of format and editorial treat-
ment over the full expanse of U.S. case law, by its citation scheme, deeply
engrained in both individual habit and practice norms, and by brand
loyalty.
LexisNexis, working under the undisclosed terms of its cross-licensing
agreement with Thomson, is able to come close to Westlaw in the timeli-
ness, comprehensiveness and citability of its case law collection. Indeed,
LexisNexis has managed to surpass Thomson in some ways. LexisNexis
has the capacity to compete with Thomson for contracts to publish official
print reports. Lexis has employed aggressive pricing to secure substantial
numbers of judicial subscriptions. Measured either in revenues or use, it
is a strong number two among lawyers. 13 4 The lower cost vendors relied
agreement to electronically transmit appellate court dispositions to Thomson/
West."); Letter from Karen Quinn, State Law Librarian, Rhode Island, to author
(Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with author) ("Unlimited and gratis access to the Rhode
Island Briefs is afforded under this contract due to the assistance of the Rhode
Island Judiciary in providing West with the data involved.").
133. See, e.g., Notice of Copyright and Trademarks, http://west.thomson.
com/copyright/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2007) ("West hereby grants users of this West
site permission to reproduce materials available therein for the sole purpose of
educating authorized users and potential users of West products or services. Re-
use or reproduction or distribution for commercial purposes is prohibited."); Cali-
fornia Courts: Opinions of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal: Special
Caution, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/continue.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2007) (providing copyright limitations for use of decisions). The LexisNexis Cali-
fornia Supreme Court database provides:
There is no charge for using the Official Reports page and there is no
copyright on opinion text, but the page is limited to personal use (see the
publisher's limitations on use).... The Official Reports page is primarily
intended to provide effective public access to all of California's preceden-
tial appellate decisions; it is not intended to function as an alternative to
commercial computer-based services and products for comprehensive le-
gal research.
Id. (same). In both instances the limitation is reinforced by the removal of star
pagination necessary for citation.
134. See Sarah Kellogg, Web Wars: Online Legal Research at the Crossroads, 65 OR.
ST. B. BULL. 8, 10 (2005) (disclosing annual sales figures in 2003 for top legal
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upon by many small firm lawyers either fail to include essential citation
information (i.e., print volume and page numbers) and post-release revi-
sions (VersusLaw), or include them only long after that information has
appeared in Westlaw and Lexis. To obtain the critical volume and page
numbers along with any post-release revisions, smaller vendors must redig-
itize the opinion texts from the still "authoritative" print reports. With
Casemaker, the resulting delay is more than six months. Consequently,
researchers using the lower tier online systems are not only burdened with
the resulting unnecessary costs passed on through the systems' charges,
but they are also forced to use other sources for the most recent decisions
and to employ print sources or the more costly online sources to obtain
citation information for any recent decisions they need to cite.
B. Simple Means for Court Systems to Re-Establish Public Control Over the
Dissemination of Their Precedent
During the mid-1990s, a series of reports urged the nation's courts to
attach full, medium-neutral citation data to decisions prior to release.
Companion recommendations called on courts to revise their rules gov-
erning briefs and memoranda to require the use of citations based on this
non-proprietary scheme. Jurisdictions were also urged to create digital
archives holding their case law in final, officially citable form-archives
open on equal terms to all publishers and members of the public.
Today, these reforms can be seen at work in several states and accessi-
ble via websites that feature capable search engines, other case finding
methods and complementary elements that make them useful tools for
the direct public dissemination of precedent. Such measures also enable
frictionless redistribution by all commercial players. 135 These are totally
feasible foundational reforms that Kansas and other states still stuck in the
print law report paradigm need to undertake. Their doing so should not
only yield direct benefits, but also clear the way to richer and more expan-
sive conceptions of precedent made possible by digital dissemination.
publishing companies and reporting Lexis as second in gross sales behind Thom-
son Corporation); Mark D. Killian, Who's Using What? Technology in Today's Law
Offices, FLA. BAR NEws,Jan. 15, 2005, at 5 (documenting research habits of Florida
attorneys and reporting that 54% of survey respondents preferred Westlaw as chief
legal research tool, 18% preferred Lexis and 12% used combination of both); Sa-
rah Palmer, If You Can't Beat 'Em, Train 'Em: How Lawyers Conduct Legal Research,
LEGAL INFO. ALERT, Jan. 1, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.abanet.org/tech/
ltrc/publications/liatraining.html (reporting results of survey finding that 49% of
respondents used Westlaw and 47% used Lexis).
135. Cf Martin, supra note 71, 36-39 (explaining that public dissemination
of structured electronic documents "facilitates . . . the work of commercial
publishers").
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V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR RICHER AND MoRE EXPANSIVE CONCEPTIONS OF
PRECEDENT ONCE DIGITAL DISSEMINATION DISPLACES PRINT AS
THE OFFICIAL CHANNEL
A. Removal of the Sharp Dichotomy Between Decisions That Are Published and
Those That Are Not
Print law reports are costly to produce, distribute and store. They are
also difficult to search. As a consequence, print dissemination of prece-
dent encourages, if it does not compel, selective publication. As reported
earlier, regardless of whether state high courts engaged in selective publi-
cation, the addition of intermediate courts of appeal to state judicial sys-
tems was almost invariably coupled with policies limiting publication of
their decisions. In most states, the choice not to publish a decision effec-
tively foreclosed access to it. Because of the serious issues that could arise
if unpublished (and therefore unknown) decisions were to serve, nonethe-
less, as binding precedent, most jurisdictions declared unpublished deci-
sions to be non-precedential.
Ultimately, selective publication became the norm. Nevertheless, ju-
risdictions varied widely with respect to both the nomenclature used to
distinguish published precedential opinions from those opinions simply
disposing of a case and the criteria for choosing which opinions belong in
the precedential category.13 6 During the latter quarter of the twentieth
century, as the volume of appeals handled by appellate courts climbed, the
percentage of opinions distributed as precedent declined.
137
136. See Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial
Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 125-27 (1994) (conceding
that publication rules "differ in procedure and degree of specificity" and discuss-
ing common characteristics among states); Jane Williams, Survey of State Court Opin-
ion Writing and Publication Practices, 83 LAw LIBR. J. 21, 22 (1991) (recognizing that
"[p]lublication standards vary widely among jurisdictions" and discussing various
state approaches with respect to publication decisions and precedential value of
published and unpublished decisions).
137. See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
2001, at 85 (BrianJ. Ostrom et al., eds., 2002); COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMIN-
ING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1998, at 101 (Brian J. Ostrom & Neal B. Kauder
eds., 1999), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/descriptions.
html#manage (follow "Court Statistics Project" hyperlink; then follow "Past Re-
ports 1975-2004" hyperlink) (reporting on percentage of cases heard and pub-
lished by intermediate appellate courts and courts of last resort for 1996 through
1998); Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 308 (1990) (conclud-
ing that at time of publication, "a majority of all final decisions by judges on the
courts of appeals [were] unpublished .... "). Kansas exemplifies the trend. In
1980, 39% of the opinions of the Kansas Court of Appeals (169 of 433) were pub-
lished. See 4 KAN. APp. 2D xi-xiii (listing unpublished opinions of Kansas Court of
Appeals in late 1979 and early 1980); 5 KAN. AP. 2D xi-xvii (listing unpublished
opinions issued by Kansas Court of Appeals from May 1980 to March 1981). By
1995, the figure had dropped to 15.8% (187 of 1181). See 20 KAN. A'p. 2D xiii-
xxxiii (listing unpublished opinions of Kansas Court of Appeals from October
1994 to April 1995); 21 KAN. APP. 2D xxxii-lvi (listing unpublished opinions of Kan-
sas Court of Appeals from May 1995 to February 1996).
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Kansas court rules divide appellate decisions into two categories: pub-
lished formal opinions and memorandum opinions. 138 Decisions are
placed in the first category only if they address new issues or are otherwise
thought to have "value as precedent." Memorandum opinions are not
"binding precedents," and their citation, while not forbidden (the case in
some other states 139 and, not so long ago, in Kansas' 40 ), is said to be "not
favored." 14 1 Nearly 90% of the decisions rendered by the Kansas Court of
Appeals are delivered by such non-precedential opinions. 14 2
Following the early lead of Lexis, online redistributors of court deci-
sions have not restricted their databases to opinions published in print law
reports. Judicial proceedings are public in the United States. Subject to
very limited exceptions, the resulting judgments are available to any
database builder prepared to make the arrangements necessary to secure
them. Originally, to load unpublished decisions into its federal and state
files, Lexis was forced to digitize physical copies of decisions obtained
from court clerks or reporters.
As courts moved to word processors and began placing opinions on
dial-up bulletin boards, the process of providing unpublished decisions
became simpler and therefore feasible for a wider range of private sector
redistributors. By the end of the twentieth century, court bulletin boards
had been supplanted by websites, most of which offered many more deci-
sions than were being distributed in print law reports. Indeed, in some
U.S. jurisdictions, legislative action encouraged or even mandated a more
comprehensive release of court opinions. The E-Government Act of 2002
requires that federal courts at all levels furnish via a public website
"[a]ccess to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, re-
gardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the official court
138. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2106(a) (2006). This distinction is authorized
but not required by statute. See id. (authorizing but not mandating that judge
prepare "[a] memorandum opinion . . . in any case where no new question of law
is decided or which is otherwise considered as having no value as a precedent.").
139. See Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report
and Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 473 (2003) (inventorying no-citation rules
and highlighting three areas in which such rules have come under fire); Melissa M.
Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication
and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCEss 349, 349 (2005)
("some [states] have clearly rejected citation of unpublished decisions .... ).
140. See Hinderks & Leben, supra note 19, at 158 n.15 (citing Gilbert Merritt,
The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of Appeal 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1393
(1990)) (noting that at time of publication, Tenth Circuit limited Internet opinion
posting to those opinions published in Federal Reporter); Serfass & Cranford,
supra note 139, at 349 (noting that Kansas and other states had adopted rules "al-
low[ing] citation of unpublished opinions either as persuasive authority or in some
cases as precedent").
141. KAN. SUP. CT. R. 7.04(f) (2) (ii) (2004) ("All memorandum opinions ...
are not favored for citation.").
142. For further discussion of the disposition of Kansas appellate and Su-
preme Court decisions, see supra notes 22 and 24-27 and accompanying text.
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reporter."1 4 3 And while the act permits removal of other digital informa-
tion concerning closed cases after one year, it mandates that "all written
opinions ... remain available online."
1 44
In numerous states where appellate courts produce "unpublished"
non-precedential opinions, judicial websites nonetheless systematically dis-
seminate those decisions. In some instances, this has occurred only in re-
sponse to pressure from lawyers and lower courts. 145  Typically,
unpublished decisions released in this fashion carry some standard notice
alerting researchers to their limited precedential value. Some states, in-
cluding Ohio, have gone so far as to erase or moderate the distinction
between "published" and "unpublished," "precedential" and "non-prece-
dential" decisions. 146 Kansas has yet to start down this path. Unpublished
Kansas decisions are available, but only upon request from the Supreme
Court Library. 147 Apparently, however, Thompson regularly requests un-
published decisions, for unpublished decisions appear in full text in
143. Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a) (5), 116 Stat. 2910, 2913 (2002).
144. Id. § 205(b) (2), 116 Stat. at 2914. This requirement to archive opinions
applies only to those opinions issued after the section's effective date, April 17,
2004. See id.
145. See, e.g., Order, Indiana Supreme Court (Aug. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/orders/other/2006/94sOO-O608-ms-299.pdf (last vis-
ited -Dec. 7, 2007) (allowing publication of "not-for-publication memorandum de-
cisions" on Internet without changing their not-for-publication status). In this
order, the Indiana Supreme Court granted the request of that state's court of ap-
peals that appellate court decisions marked "Not for Publication" be released and
stored at the Indiana Courts' website. See id.
146. See OHIO SUP. CT. R. FOR REPORTING OF OPINIONs 4 (abolishing distinc-
tion between precedential and non-precedential opinions in absence of Supreme
Court's decision that particular case should not be relied upon as legal authority).
Ohio's rule, enacted in 2002, maintained the non-precedential status of unre-
ported decisions handed down prior to the enactment of the rule. See id.; see also
Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734, 736-39 (Utah 2002) (rejecting view that un-
published decisions of state's court of appeals were not binding precedent). Id. at
737.
147. See, e.g., Opinions Released Jan. 5, 2007, http://www.kscourts.org/ks
cases/ctapp/2007/20070105/20070105.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007) (stating
that full-text versions of unpublished opinions are not available on web and to
contact Kansas Supreme Court Law Library for such decisions). Whereas Lexis
notes the existence of dispositions "without published opinion" by both the Kansas
Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeals, it does not go to the trouble of
gathering and disseminating either court's supporting memorandum opinions.
Compare Citizens Bank v. Kan. Bankers Sur. Co., 149 P.3d 25 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007)
(unpublished) as it appears on Lexis with the Westlaw version. By contrast, both
Lexis and Westlaw provide access to "unpublished" decisions of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, which they are able to collect at the state website, warning users
that under Wisconsin's appellate rules, these decisions have "no precedential
value" and "may not be cited." See, e.g., Wood v. Anacker, 2005 WI App 176 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished) (listed in disposition table in state's print law re-
ports, 285 Wis. 2d 807, 701 N.W.2d 654, but available in full text at court website
and on both Westlaw and Lexis).
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Westlaw less than a week after release. 1 48 They are not to be found, how-
ever, on Lexis, Casemaker or any of the other online systems. Recall that
while Westlaw is the system used by Kansas appellate judges, not all district
judges in the state have access to it, nor, of course, do all lawyers.
With a medium that does not require selective dissemination, the case
for distinguishing between precedential and non-precedential appellate
decisions on the basis of print publication is difficult (if not impossible) to
make. 149 The consequences of continuing such policies are particularly
troubling when "unpublished," "non-precedential" decisions are in fact
available through one or more commercial systems, but not at the judici-
ary's public site. 150 The digital environment allows appellate courts to tag
those opinions they believe to involve routine application of settled law
and for those conducting case research to focus initially on other opin-
ions, without giving rise to all the problems that can flow from withhold-
ing opinions from general circulation on that ground or declaring those
opinions non-precedential and uncitable. 15 1
B. Inclusion of Trial Court Decisions in the Flow of Precedent
The same capacity, cost and search concerns that induced most U.S.
jurisdictions to publish only selected appellate decisions led, with but a few
exceptions, to trial court decisions being completely excluded from organ-
ized distribution and availability as precedent.1 5 2 Trial courts are, of
course, bound by vertical precedent flowing down from the jurisdiction's
appellate courts, but they have not generally been seen as producing pre-
148. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, No. 95,660, 2007 WL 959618 (Kan. Ct. App.
Mar. 30, 2007) (unpublished) (providing full text of unpublished opinion).
149. Even so, some jurisdictions have continued to reaffirm a policy of deny-
ing unpublished decisions any precedential value, reinforced by rules forbidding
their citation. See, e.g., In re Amendment of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.23(3) Regard-
ing Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 2003 WI 84, available at http://www.wi
courts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=953 (show-
ing petition to amend rule barring citation of unpublished decisions denied, two
justices dissenting). The one place the court's decision does not appear is in
N.W.2d. Using the "neutral" cite one can retrieve it at the public site and also on
Lexis.
150. Unequal access has been an enduring problem with "unreported deci-
sions." See Dragich, supra note 86, at 778 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827 (1991)) ("Inherent in certainty is the idea that it is sometimes more important
to have a well-established rule than to search endlessly for the best rule."); Lauren
K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government
Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REv. 940, 955 (1989) (find-
ing that "research on institutional litigants indicates that the methods the courts
employ to discourage use of unpublished opinions-limited distribution and no-
citation-do not work"). Robel goes on to say that these methods actually "aggra-
vate and enhance any inherent unfairness the selective publication plans might
have." Id.
151. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1373-77 (1995).
152. See supra notes 18-19, 87-90 and accompanying text.
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cedent in any form. Yet the experience of those jurisdictions that publish
some trial court decisions and examples from others where local distribu-
tion channels-legal newspapers, bar publications and in recent years
websites-have given courts and counsel access to trial decisions demon-
strate their value as precedent in the looser non-binding sense. There is,
of course, the conspicuous example of the federal courts. Decisions of the
U.S. District Courts, including many not published in print, are widely
cited and relied upon even though they are not binding precedent.153
Important legal questions can recur in litigation numerous times
without being appealed. For example, the question whether data available
from an automobile's black box can be admitted as evidence of the vehi-
cle's speed without a prior hearing on reliability has been addressed by
appellate courts of a few states, but not New York. 154 The issue must,
therefore, be addressed by New York trial courts without the direction of
vertical precedent. Because trial court decisions do circulate in New York,
including significant numbers beyond those selected for publication in
the official reports, any New York lawyer or judge confronting this ques-
tion can find guidance in several unappealed lower court rulings. 155
There are particular legal domains within which important legal is-
sues are repeatedly litigated without ever being appealed to a court pro-
ducing decisions eligible for publication in a law report. Family law is one
of these areas. Since 1977, selected opinions of Delaware's state-wide fam-
ily court have been published in print,156 on average five to six per
year. 15 7 Beginning in the 1980s, first Lexis and then Westlaw began to
load the court's "unpublished decisions." Today, both systems have signifi-
cant collections of Delaware family court precedent. 15 8 All of Delaware's
judiciary, including family court judges, has access to both online ser-
vices. 159 On such context-dependent questions as the division of assets
and liabilities in a divorce, 160 the termination of alimony because of "co-
153. See, e.g., TMF Tool Co. v. Muller, 913 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569, 572
(7th Cir. 1987).
154. See, e.g., Bachman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d 262 (2002) (judging
admissibility of sensory data from air bag systems).
155. See, e.g., People v. Slade, No. 0666-03, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3217 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 2005); People v. Hopkins, No. 2004-0338, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
2902 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Aug. 30, 2004); People v. Christmann, 776 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y.
Vill. Just. Ct. 2004).
156. See BLUEBOOK, supra note 48, tbl.T.1, at 204.
157. As ofJune 15, 2007, Westlaw contained 167 Delaware Family Court deci-
sions with "A.2d" citations.
158. For 2006, Westlaw added 228 decisions; Lexis added 233.
159. E-mail from Chris H. Sudell, Deputy State Court Administrator, Dela-
ware, to author (Feb. 26, 2007) (on file with author).
160. See P.L. v. W.L., No. CN05-04694, 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 264 (Del.
Fam. Ct. Dec. 13, 2006).
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habitation," 161 or extension of parental custody preference to a "de facto"
relationship,1 62 Delaware family courts are able to find more guidance in
other family court decisions than in opinions of the state's supreme
court. 1
63
Providing vastly expanded access to trial court decisions is feasible in
a digital age. In many states, however, that may require a coordinated
public initiative. Montana illustrates the point. Until recently, the official
publisher of opinions of the Montana Supreme Court was a local firm,
State Reporter of Helena. The firm also operated an online database.
164
While not publishing Montana trial court opinions in print, it began to
add them to this online system, offering free access to those courts that
contributed decisions. 165 Eventually all courts responded. By the year
2001, approximately 2,000 district court opinions were being added per
year.16 6 Lawyers referred to them; district judges cited them.' 67 When
LexisNexis acquired State Reporter in 2005, this database of over 16,000
trial opinions became part of Lexis, but the relationship with Montana's
district courts was ruptured. The annual flow of district court opinions
dropped dramatically.' 68 Competing collection development priorities
make it unlikely, at least in the short term, that Lexis will restore the opin-
ion flow.' 69 Montana's district courts have been brought under the state
judiciary's Lexis contract so that all judges in the state have access to this
collection of trial court opinions, but its value is no longer being main-
tained. 170 Longer term, an electronic case document system planned by
the state may, as it has in other jurisdictions,' 7 1 open trial decisions to
161. See M.D. v. C.D., No. CN01-09121, 2007 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 11 (Del.
Fam. Ct. Mar. 15, 2007).
162. See Dep't of Servs. for Children, Youth and their Families v. T.P., No.
CN05-04690, 2007 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 32 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 20, 2007).
163. Many of the most challenging issues that family court judges confront
fall within zones of discretion not reviewed by the Delaware Supreme Court. See,
e.g.,Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 188 (Del. 1990) (discussing review of trial court's
decision under abuse of discretion standard).
164. "Montlaw" was established in 1990. See Wayback Machine, http://web.
archive.org/web/20000824074346/www.statereporter.com/company.htm.
165. Telephone interview with Judy Meadows, Montana State Law Librarian
(Jan. 1, 2007).
166. The Montana district court decisions now on Lexis total 2,162 for 2001,
1,986 for 2002, 2,030 for 2003 and 2,008 for 2004.
167. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Stevens, No. ADV-2003-722, 2005 Mont. Dist. LEXIS
1423, at *2 (Mont. lstJud. Dist. Ct. Nov. 17, 2005); Valley Capital v. Smith, DV 99-
370, 2001 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2664, at *16 (Mont. l8thJud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2001).
168. Lexis contains 1,379 Montana district court decisions for 2005, 1,075 for
2006 and only 216 for the first six months of 2007.
169. E-mail from Jane W. Morris, Director, Customer Programs, Primary Law
Editorial & Content Development, LexisNexis, to Judy Meadows, Montana State
Law Librarian (July 13, 2007) (on file with author).
170. Meadows, supra note 165.
171. The federal courts' CM/ECF system is one example. See, e.g., Case Man-
agement/Electronic Case Filing System (CM/ECF), http://pacer.psc.uscourts.
gov/announcements/general/ecfnews.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). The New
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direct public access and facilitate commercial redistribution (by more
than a single provider).
Including trial opinions in the pool of available precedent not only
provides trial judges with useful guidance in situations where they are not
bound by vertical precedent, but it affords appellate courts a broader view
of individual appeals by enabling them to see how trial courts collectively
have dealt with vexing issues. Access to trial court decisions is also valua-
ble to those who are seeking to avoid litigation, deciding whether to liti-
gate, contemplating settlement of a dispute or weighing the need for
legislation in an area. 172 Finally, accessible trial court opinions may make
it possible for some appellate decisions to be brief.173 In the evident belief
that there is potential demand for state trial court opinions, Westlaw has
very recently begun collecting and offering "State Trial Court Orders." Al-
ready, the database holds over 350,000 decisions, most from the largest
states and dating from the past five years. 174
C. Opinions Structured Not Merely For Print But For Digital Distribution,
Navigation and Search
Most state court websites, like that of the U.S. Supreme Court, offer
digital files that are designed to replicate the paper "slip opinions" for
which they substitute. This has the advantage of assuring consistent pagi-
nation and format-indented quotations are indented; emphasized text is
shown in bold or italics; embedded maps, photographs and other graphic
material are displayed in context. The dominant format is the portable
document format (pdf). That approach, powerful evidence in itself of the
York Unified Court System's eCourts is another. See E-Courts, http://www.courts.
state.ny.us/ecourts/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
172. See Lynn Mather, Policy Making in State Trial Courts, in THE AMERJCAN
CouRTs: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 119, 119 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson
eds., 1991).
173. See, e.g., Millivision, Inc. v. Gardner, No. MW 05-054, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS
514, at *1-2 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Apr. 10, 2006) (unpublished). The court in Millivision
stated:
The bankruptcy court's rationale is fully explicated in its written decision,
Ostrander v. Gardner (In re Millivision, Inc.), 331 B.R. 515 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2005). Judge Boroff thoroughly considered appellants' arguments and
laid each to rest, applying correctly this circuit's summary judgment stan-
dard. Id. at 520.
Where, as here, the lower court's accurate, clearly articulated legal
conclusions lay all appellants' complaints to rest, nothing would be added
by a lengthy recapitulation of fact or law on our part. We need not, will
not, toot our own trumpet in view of these premises.
For the reasons ably stated by the court below, its judgment is
AFFIRMED.
Id. at *1-2.
174. E-mail from Timothy Nixon, Thomson / West, to author (Oct. 10, 2007)
(on file with author). See Westlaw Litigator-State Trial Court Orders, http://
west.thomson.com/westlaw/litigator/statetrialcourtorders/?tf=90&tc-14 (last vis-
ited Dec. 7, 2007).
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continuing hold of the print paradigm, is seriously deficient for docu-
ments destined to reach readers by means of a database search or other
electronic process.
The Kansas judicial site neither preserves all the print features of the
decisions it distributes (indented quotations, for example, display no in-
dentation) nor enhances them with fields, metadata and other structural
attributes that would facilitate their use in today's virtual libraries (e.g.,
searches by date, docket number or opinion author). In short, the me-
dium is not taken seriously.
Taking digital dissemination seriously requires encoding the struc-
ture, not merely the appearance of opinions. This entails separating such
distinct data elements as syllabus, judge, date, cited authority and the
structure of opinions' legal analysis as reflected in their headings and sub-
headings and linking to cited references. XML, the data standard capable
of doing all this, is now built into most forms of text handling software
including Adobe Acrobat, Word and WordPerfect, and the major contem-
porary Internet browsers. This capacity needs to be used. Taking this
largely invisible step can have a positive effect on the usefulness of court
websites and, at the same time, reduce the costs of redistribution through
commercial systems. One can even imagine it having a long range benefi-
cial effect on the analytic structure of decisions.
D. Precedent Augmented by Related Data
Throughout their history, U.S. print law reports, whether prepared by
public reporters or commercially published, have bundled pertinent other
material with judicial opinions. The earliest American law reports actually
devoted more attention to these matters than to the words coming from
the judges. 175 Editorial notes, summaries of arguments of counsel and
indices were-and still are-common features. In addition, opinion au-
thors have, on occasion, placed important background material in appen-
dices. 176 Limitations of the medium effectively required some of these
editorial enhancements (hyperlinks not being an option), but print also
severely restricted the amount of supplementary data and forced hard
choices about placement in relation to opinion text. The digital environ-
ment has at once reduced the need for some editorial features, dramati-
cally relaxed the quantitative constraints, expanded format options and
enabled direct access to vast amounts of background material previously
unavailable to all but the most resolute researchers.
175. See Kempin, supra note 42, at 35 (explaining that until very end of eight-
eenth century, reporters were mostly interested in arguments of counsel); Tiersma,
supra note 4, at 1223 (explaining that early American reports "would have resulted
from a private individual sitting in a courtroom, taking notes of what the lawyers
argued and the opinions or judgments that the judges delivered, and publishing a
synopsis of the proceedings").
176. See, e.g., Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, Inc. v. State, 153 P.3d 296, 302-03
(Ala. 2007); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 800-02 (Colo. 1990).
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With limited exceptions, the headnotes and issue summaries pre-
pared for official print reports by public law reporters have not accompa-
nied the decisions themselves onto the Internet or into commercial online
collections. For Westlaw and Lexis, their inclusion would be redundant;
for most of the others, it is too costly. Following the historic approach of
the National Reporter System, except as its publishing contracts require
otherwise, Westlaw replaces all state-produced notes with proprietary edi-
torial matter. Lexis now does much the same, although for some states,
including a few for which it publishes the print reports, the service inserts
"official headnotes" following its own. Loislaw, which adds no analytic
summaries of its own preparation, includes reporters' notes in a somewhat
larger number of jurisdictions, presumably those states important to its
subscriber base for which acquiring both the data and rights to use it are
not especially difficult. The other online case law services simply omit law
report content not authored by the court itself. Apparently, they have
concluded, not unreasonably, that in a searchable collection of precedent,
jurisdiction-specific editorial additions contribute insufficient value to jus-
tify the substantial costs of including them.
These costs exceed those of gathering the underlying court opinions
for two reasons. First, with only a handful of exceptions, state preparation
of headnotes, syllabi and the like occurs well after release of the decisions.
Being generated during the print publication process, these post-release
enhancements neverjoin the opinions on a court website. Any online dis-
tributor desiring to merge them with the underlying opinions must, there-
fore, digitize their text from the print reports. The difficulty is
compounded by copyright issues. States and publishers producing such
supplementary material, even those that acknowledge that judicial opin-
ions per se are in the public domain, quite commonly assert copyright in
all law report editorial additions. 177
Only when digital dissemination and competitive redistribution are
taken seriously will those jurisdictions still preparing case summaries and
analytic indices for print be likely to attend to the challenge of adapting
content of this sort to online case law and to let go of concerns about
redistribution. Beyond linked and searchable headnotes and case summa-
ries are myriad possibilities. Court systems have begun to deploy com-
puter-based case and file management systems. Some encourage or even
require electronic filing of briefs and other case documents. Many now
record all oral arguments digitally. Increasingly, those reading a judicial
opinion online should be able, if they choose, to read it against the full
arguments made by counsel, the record on appeal and perhaps statistical
177. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAw § 438 (2007); Agreement between Gary D. Spivey,
New York State Reporter, and West Publishing Co. § 7, at 13 (Oct. 25, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.access-to-law.com/elaw/contracts/NY_2005.PDF. The distinc-
tion between the opinions per se and a reporter's editorial additions traces back to
Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
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data on the judges' dispositions in similar cases. A number of these ele-
ments are already in place on state court websites. 178
E. Opinions Employing More Than Text
The world to which law and therefore precedent must relate has
color, shape, texture, sound and movement. The technology and eco-
nomics of print law report publication have effectively limited precedent
to text.
Over a decade ago, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered an important
trademark opinion in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. 1 79 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Breyer construed the language defining the
reach of the Lanham Act-"word, name, symbol, or device"-as encom-
passing color. 180 Qualitex had registered "a special shade of green-gold"
as a trademark for pads it sold to dry cleaning firms. 18 1 The litigation that
brought this issue to the Court arose when a competitor, Jacobson Prod-
ucts, began selling pads of a similar color.18 2 Prior law on this point was
far from settled, but market realities had already broken down narrow
readings of the Act.
The Court's decision explored and ruled on the role of color in iden-
tifying the Qualitex pressing pads without aid of an image of this "green-
gold" object or its "similar" competitor. Three years earlier in Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,18 3 the Court dealt with the question whether
Taco Cabana's restaurant decor constituted trade dress protected by Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act.184 The issue came framed by ajury finding
that the restaurant chain's interior and exterior had not acquired secon-
dary meaning but were "inherently distinctive." 185 The opinion begins
with a short description of Taco Cabana's Mexican trade dress. 186 A pho-
178. See, e.g., North Dakota Supreme Court Home Page, http://www.court.
state.nd.us/. All recent decisions of the court carry a link to their docket entries,
which, among other things, provide access to the parties' briefs and audio record-
ings of the oral arguments. At the Oklahoma State Courts Network site, recent
opinions of the state supreme court link back to the trial court proceedings, pro-
viding docket entries and documents filed or issued below. See, e.g., Oklahoma
City Zoological Trust v. State, 158 P.3d 461 (Okla. 2007), available at http://www.
oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=448713. The Michigan
Supreme Court site offers briefs filed in cases from April 2002 forward. See Su-
preme Court Summaries of Oral Argument, http://courts.michigan.gov/
supremecourt/Clerk/msc-orals-2001-2002-session.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
179. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
180. Id. at 162.
181. Id. at 161.
182. Id.
183. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
184. Id. at 764-65.
185. Id. at 766.
186. Id. at 765 (citing Taco Cabana Intem., Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d
1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991)).
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tograph or two drawn from the record would undoubtedly have been
more useful.
In the years since, the Supreme Court has begun to incorporate
images and color in its opinions. From the beginning of 1999 through the
end of the October 2006 term, ten opinions issued by the Court have in-
cluded a graph, map or other image.' 87 In the previous decade, there
were none. In April 2007, with a case in which a sixteen minute police
video was pivotal, the majority opinion effectively incorporated the clip by
means of a link to a digital video file loaded onto the Supreme Court
website. 18 8 The pathbreaking passage by Justice Scalia reads:
Justice Stevens suggests that our reaction to the videotape is
somehow idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresent-
ing its contents.... We are happy to allow the videotape to speak
for itself. See Record 36, Exh. A, available at http://www.su-
premecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scottv_harris.rmvb and in
Clerk of Court's case file.' 89
The Supreme Court's movement in this area has paralleled a gradual
shift in the lower federal courts and states. That graphics-capable com-
puters have prompted inclusion of non-textual material in court opin-
ions-just as they have in many other forms of writing-is hardly
surprising. More revealing, perhaps, is how slow the change has been.
United States precedent remains heavily text bound. Out of the
thousands of federal court decisions decided in 2006 and loaded into
Lexis, only 157 include a chart, map, photograph or other graphical ele-
ment. The count for the same year's state court decisions is sixty-three.
Ironically, such figures can readily be determined on Lexis because the
service does not include images in its database, apparently without serious
market disadvantage to date. Wherever an opinion contains a photo-
graph, diagram, map, form or other image, Lexis replaces it with an edito-
rial note referring the user to the "printed opinion" or the "original."'1 90
187. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 342 (2004); Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654, 685 (2003); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 278 (2002); Williams v.
United States, 535 U.S. 911, 922 (2002); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 52
(2001); New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 756 (2001); Overton v. Ohio, 534
U.S. 982, 986 (2001); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 14243 (1999);
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 554 (1999); NewJersey v. NewYork, 526 U.S. 589,
602 (1999).
188. Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (2007).
189. Id. at 1775 n.5. Contrast a recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court that concerned the use at trial of a computer-generated animation depicting
the prosecution's theory of how a murder took place. Commonwealth v. Serge,
896 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2006). The opinion's guidance for trial judges having to rule
on such demonstrative evidence would have been far clearer had it, like Scott v.
Harris, directed readers to the video clip in question rather than relying on a brief
textual description.
190. For example, see the Lexis versions of Williams v. United States, 535 U.S.
911, 922 (2002), ("[Graphic images omitted. See printed opinion.]") and Sunday
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Today, that "original" as mounted at a court website will, in all likelihood,
include the graphic material, in color where called for. Fastcase,
Casemaker and VersusLaw join Lexis in omitting non-textual material.
Westlaw and LoisLaw provide scanned images, but only in black and white.
A moment's reflection on today's web environment should make it
clear that once dissemination of precedent is liberated from the econom-
ics and technical limits of print, and commercial databases respond-as
they will have to-to opinions containing images and charts, complete
with color, there are numerous situations where clarity should be en-
hanced. After all, visual exhibits can be immensely effective in the trial
setting. If the proverbial picture-word ratio holds, opinion length could
be reduced. Major second order consequences are also likely. 19 1 Some
have argued that the absence of images from printed law promotes the use
of abstract concepts and that the shift to electronic media is likely to re-
duce their hold on our legal system.19 2
VI. INSTITUTIONAL INHIBITIONS AND SOURCES OF RESISTANCE
All these changes in the content, format and function of precedent
are attainable and, over time, very likely inevitable. None of them will
come soon, easily or uniformly across the United States. Sources of inhibi-
tion, incapacity and affirmative resistance are numerous.
Old habits die hard, especially when they are embedded in institu-
tional architecture. First, techniques for working with and referring to
precedent are learned in the first year of law study. As swiftly as possible,
they are mastered to the point of becoming background tasks, to be per-
formed with a minimum of conscious effort. To those generations who
learned to find and analyze cases using print law reports and to cite opin-
ions using volume and page numbers, electronic versions delivered online
are most comfortably thought of in relation to that prior form. Learning a
new mode of citation can seem as daunting as changing a golf swing or
mastering a non-QWERTY keyboard, and as unnecessary.
Second, powerful commercial interests have a stake in slowing-if not
blocking-these changes and maintaining the judiciary's dependence on
the private sector for precedent dissemination, including such core func-
tions as attachment of citation information, quality assurance, editorial en-
hancement and archiving.
v. Harboway, 136 P.3d 965, 967 (Mont. 2006), ("[SEE ILLUSTRATION IN
ORIGINAL]").
191. See generally Richard K. Sherwin, Neal Feigenson & Christina Spiesel, Law
in the Digital Age: How Visual Communication Technologies Are Transforming the Practice,
Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. L. REv. 227, 239-45 (2006).
192. See M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF LAw 247-65 (1989); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 133-71 (1995);
see also Kenneth H. Ryesky, From Pens to Pixels: Text-Media Issues in Promulgating,
Archiving, and Using Judicial Opinions, 4J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 353, 358-66 (2002).
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Third, while it is common to speak of a state's courts as a "judicial
system" or even a "unified system," the array of courts in many U.S. juris-
dictions do not comprise coherent units, administered and financed as a
whole. Adapting the model of state responsibility for dissemination of pre-
cedent represented by preparation and distribution of public law reports
and the maintenance of public law libraries to the new reality of online law
requires a level of jurisdiction-wide leadership, administration and fund-
ing all-too-rare in the states. Even in jurisdictions like Kansas where trial
courts fall under a significant measure of state control and funding, deci-
sions about and the funding of online research services together with
other support costs often remain a county or judicial district responsibility.
The most complete embrace of digital methods of disseminating prece-
dent has occurred in states where responsibility for meeting the legal in-
formation needs of judges at all levels, not merely those hearing appeals,
has been consolidated within court systems that are unified in reality, not
simply in name. 1
9 3
Finally, judges are, and ought to be, busy being judges. In the press
of performing that distinctive role, systemic issues of citation, opinion for-
mat and case law dissemination may seem peripheral at best. From the
perspective of an appellate judge, proposals to include more opinions in
the pool of precedents can easily sound like more work, unjustified by
speculative gains. Those judges who hold key leadership and administra-
tive responsibilities are in most instances served by high-end legal informa-
tion services, and as a consequence, are likely to have limited appreciation
of the diffuse burdens of cost and inconvenience experienced by small
firm lawyers, trial judges, other government workers and the general
public.
VII. CONCLUSION
The good news is that within the experimental space created by our
nation's fifty-state federal structure, vision, leadership and capacity have
already aligned in a number of states to furnish at least a foretaste of what
precedent in a digital age can look like and to provide solid examples or
prototypes on which other states and the federal courts can draw. These
developments warrant greater attention. Achieving more efficient, more
effective and less costly dissemination of precedent, while expanding and
deepening its scope, are goals well within reach. They are, however, at-
tended by challenges that call for serious scholarly inquiry, identification
and exchange of best practices, and sustained public leadership.
The World Wide Web has presented researchers of all sorts with
quantities of information far beyond past imagining, thereby giving rise to
concerns about information overload. Similarly, the prospect of digitally
193. See Martin, supra note 71, 53 (describing North Dakota's and
Oklahoma's transitions, led by "leadership from one or more members of thejuris-
diction's highest court and an information expert working closely with them").
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accessible case law that includes all appellate decisions (not simply a small
selected fraction), many decisions of trial courts, deep background data
on cases and non-textual material inevitably prompts fears of lawyers and
judges being overwhelmed, with adverse consequences for the cost and
quality of justice. That is a possible outcome, but only if both the way
precedent operates and the tools for searching, filtering and ranking legal
information remain static. The historic interplay between ideas about pre-
cedent and the means for its dissemination suggests the former is unlikely.
The rapid development of sophisticated Internet search tools provides
strong evidence that with the right combination of public sector involve-
ment and private sector competition in the dissemination of legal informa-
tion, the latter need not occur. Some have suggested that access to vastly
more judicial opinions may induce a return to much earlier notions of
precedent that gave greater weight to facts and outcome than what the
judges said.194 A related speculation is that weight of opinions as prece-
dent will come to be less dichotomous (binding versus having no prece-
dential effect) with the force of a non-binding decision becoming much
more a function of the reputation of the court and the opinion author,
the evident thoroughness of research and the clarity and force of its rea-
soning. 19 5 Should either or both of these shifts occur, it is not difficult to
imagine software tools being devised that would facilitate retrieval and
analysis of relevant decision data by legal professionals, scholars and
others, including the public. Opinions identified by a search could, for
example, be arranged according to the number of citations to them in
subsequent decisions and briefs. 19 6 Statistical and other forms of pattern
analysis are likely to prove useful in some fields.
In many-if not most-states, the front-line trial courts that adjudi-
cate the broad range of civil disputes, divorces and other domestic issues,
traffic violations and criminal charges are widely dispersed. Historic
norms of geographic proximity and local accountability place judges in
sparsely populated and under-resourced areas. 19 7 Effective legal represen-
tation at the trial court level is more an aspiration than pervasive reality.
Error-correction through appeal is spotty; less than one-third of one per-
194. See Tiersma, supra note 4, at 1272.
195. See id. at 1273; Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Fed-
eral Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS
1, 9-12 (2002).
196. One of the options Fastcase provides its users is the presentation of a set
of search results in order of the number of citations to each of the retrieved
decisions.
197. New York's Town and Village Justice Courts, presided over by roughly
2,000 justices, hear two million cases a year. JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN,
ACTION PLAN FOR THE JUSTICE COURTS, STATE OF NEW YORK UNITED COURT SYSTEM,
at preface (2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/pdfs/
ActionPlan-JusticeCourts.pdf. Under the state constitution, they are more closely
tied to local government than New York's "Unified Court System." The majority of
these justices are not lawyers, and in smaller communities court infrastructure is
minimal. Id.
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cent of trial court decisions are appealed. 19 8 For these and other reasons,
no one should suppose that improvements in the dissemination and oper-
ation of precedent of the sort surveyed here will, without more, dramati-
cally enhance the consistency and accuracy of trial court decision-making.
While they constitute a critical component, the larger goal calls for atten-
tion to judicial qualifications and training, the creation and distribution of
manuals, benchbooks and computer-based systems capable of furnishing
"on demand" guidance, and greater administrative supervision and ac-
countability. Many of these measures draw upon the precedent system
and will therefore, at least indirectly, benefit from its improvement. (Most
of them can also gain substantial leverage from digital information and
communication technologies. But those are topics for another day.) Pre-
cedent, broadly conceived and reconfigured for digital dissemination and
access, has more than enough practical and symbolic connection to
broader notions of rule of law, stability and predictability to warrant seri-
ous study on its own.
198. State trial courts have over the last decade received a fairly steady flow of
33,600 cases per 100,000 residents, a ratio that yields a current annual court filing
figure in the neighborhood of 100 million. See National Center for State Courts,
Examining the Work of State Courts, 2005 at 14 (2005), available at http://www.
ncsconline.org/D-Research/csp/2005_files/3-EWOverview final_l.pdf. During
the same period, state appellate courts received fewer than 300,000 appeals a year.
See id. at 74, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2005_files/9-
EWAppellate-final-l.pdf.
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